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ABSTRACT 
Corporate Boards of Directors: A Study 
of the Relationship of Board Structure 
and Composition and Corporate Performance 
September 1984 
RICHARD MOLZ 
B.S. Clarkson College 
M.B.A. University of Rochester 
Ph.D. University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor George Odiorne 
This study examines the relationship of the structure 
and composition of corporate boards of directors and 
measures of financial and social performance. The study 
was done in three phases, [1] developing a model that can 
discriminate boards as being more managerial dominated or 
pluralistic, [2] using this model to study the 
relationship of board form to financial and social 
performance, and [3] examining the particular attributes 
most associated with superior financial and social 
performance. 
In phase one a discriminant model was developed using 
fifty firms selected at random from the 1982 Fortune 500 
Industrial list. Using ten measures of board structure 
and compositon a confirmatory factor analysis provided 
vi i i 
input into a discriminant model that could identify boards 
as managerial dominated or pluralistic. 
In phase two this model was used with two separate 
sub-populations of the Fortune 500 Industrial list. Two 
hypotheses were tested; the first relating managerial 
dominated boards to superior financial performance and the 
second relating pluralistic boards to superior social 
performance. The financial performance hypothesis was 
tested using 45 Fortune 500 food firms, while the social 
performance hyothesis was tested using firms identified by 
two independent cross-industry measures of social 
performance. Neither hypothesis was supported. 
Phase three compared the ten attributes of 
composition and structure with various measures of 
financial and social performance. The boards that were 
most associated with superior financial performance were 
characterized as having normative control of the 
organization. The boards most associated with superior 
social performance seemed to be characterized by consensus 
decision making and a common sense of values. A 
contingency theory of board composition and structure was 
developed, relating board form to superior corporate 
per f ormanee . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . v 
ABSTRACT.viii 
CHAPTER 
I INTRODUCTION  1 
Overview  1 
Synopsis of Methodology . 3 
Background. 6 
II LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT . 12 
Literature Review  12 
Problem Development . 36 
III METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS.41 
Phase One - Building a Model.41 
Phase Two - Hypothesis Testing.67 
Phase Three - Board Attributes and 
Corporate Performance . 77 
IV ANALYSIS OF RESULTS.87 
Financial Performance  87 
Social Performance.95 
V DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION . Ill 
A Contingency Theory of Board 
Composition and Structure  112 
Implications for Future Research.116 
Operational Implications.119 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . 122 
APPENDIX A: FORTUNE 500 INDUSTRIAL FIRMS USED 
IN RESEARCH.130 
APPENDIX B: ATTRIBUTES OF FIRMS USED IN MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT, PHASE 1.135 
APPENDIX C: ATTRIBUTES OF FIRMS USED IN FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS.139 
x 
APPENDIX D: ATTRIBUTES OF FIRMS USED IN SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSIS . 143 
APPENDIX E: CORRELATION MATRIX OF ATTRIBUTES IN 
FINANCIAL MODELING.146 
APPENDIX F: CORRELATION MATRIX OF ATTRIBUTES IN 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY MODELING.148 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. MEASURABLE ATTRIBUTES, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
AND EXPECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF MANAGERIAL 
AND PLURALISTIC BOARDS.52 
2. CORRELATION MATRIX OF ATTRIBUTES IN MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT; PHASE 1.54 
3. CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS LOADING, MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT; PHASE 1.57 
4. DISCRIMINANT CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION, MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT; PHASE 1.61 
5. TYPICAL ATTRIBUTES OF TWO BOARDS AS A 
DEMONSTRATION OF FACE VALIDITY.64 
6. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, ROE, ROA, TRS TAKEN 
INDEPENDENTLY WITH BOARD CATEGORY; HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING [1], PHASE II.72 
7. CHI SQUARE TEST OF DIFFERENCES, MANAGERIAL 
DOMINATED VERSUS PLURALISTIC BOARDS BY 
RESPONSIBLE AND LESS RESPONSIBLE FIRMS; 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING [2], PHASE II.76 
8. CANONICAL CORRELATIONS OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
AND BOARD ATTRIBUTES; FINANCIAL MODELING, 
PHASE I I.79 
9. STEPWISE REGRESSION, RETURN ON EQUITY, 
FINANCIAL MODELING, PHASE III . 81 
10. STEPWISE REGRESSION, RETURN ON ASSETS, 
FINANCIAL MODELING, PHASE III  82 
11. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
WITH BOARD ATTRIBUTES; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
MODELING, PHASE III.84 
12. SIGNS OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR MULTIPLE 
REGRESSION.89 
13. LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AND RANGE OF ATTRIBUTES.100 
14. FORTUNE 500 INDUSTRIAL FIRMS USED IN RESEARCH . 131 
15. ATTRIBUTES OF FIRMS USED IN MODEL DEVELOPMENT; 
PHASE I.136 
16. ATTRIBUTES OF FIRMS USED IN FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS.140 
XI 1 
17. ATTRIBUTES OF FIRMS USED IN SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSIS . 144 
18. CORRELATION MATRIX OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES - 
FINANCIAL MODELING.147 
19. CORRELATION MATRIX OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES - 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY MODELING.149 




The focus of this research is corporate boards of 
directors. Boards of directors have the ability to 
compose and structure themselves in nearly any manner they 
choose; there are few constraints upon their actions in 
these areas, and those existing constraints are generally 
modifiable at the board's recommendation. The board 
serves a legitimization function within the capitalist 
system, being the focal point of interaction between the 
firm’s owners and the professional managers. The board is 
the unit of the organization recognized in the corporate 
charter as having the authority to manage the 
cor porat ion . 
The board has been assigned a lofty position within 
our society, in terms of corporate chartering, 
legitimization and representation of owners. But there is 
a fundamental question: Is the board only for appearance? 
Does the board actually affect the way a firm acts? These 
1 
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are not moot questions. Several authors have suggested 
the board is dominated by management, and is as such only 
one more vehicle for officers and professional managers to 
control the corporation. Others have noted a widening 
gulf between ownership and control of the corporation. 
Still others have suggested that by reformulating the 
board, by changing its composition and structure, the 
fundamental actions of the firm could somehow be changed. 
In the view of Pfeffer and Salancik [1978], management and 
the board is overwhelmed by the range of choice 
alternatives and constraints on resources, relegating the 
decision making process to be only symbolic. Given such 
an effete role, both the board and management structure 
should be unrelated to corporate performance. 
The objective of this research is to investigate 
these kinds of problems. Does a fundamental relationship 
exist between the board’s composition and structure and 
the performance of large firms? If so, is there some 
composition and structure that is related to superior 
performance? The research investigates directly the 
composition and structure of boards of directors of 
Fortune 500 Industrial firms, and compares the board form 
[structure and composition] with measures of the firm s 
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financial and social performance. The research is not an 
attempt to study the sociological interactions within the 
board, nor does it attempt to develop totally new measures 
of financial or social performance. Rather, the attempt 
is to relate board composition and structure to relevant 
measures of financial and social performance. 
Synopsis of Methodology 
This research can be identified as design research, 
in the sense used by Litterer and Jelenik [1982]; it is 
not pure "knowledge" research, nor is it applied or 
"action" research. Rather it is oriented toward bridging 
the gap between these two extremes. It is grounded in 
theory, but its results are of benefit to individuals 
wishing to affect corporate behavior through the board of 
directors. Still, it is not organization specific, hence 
its classification as design research. 
Corporate boards of directors differ markedly with 
the size of the corporation. Small corporations 
frequently have owner-managers who make up the entire 
board, while larger corporations have been seen as having 
boards more representative of professional managers than 
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owners [Berle and Means, 1967; Chandler, 1977], It is 
irresponsible to infer that shareholder democracy does not 
function well in these closely held firms, as the 
shareholders are the firm. But it is also a dubious claim 
that shareholder democracy is ineffective in most publicly 
held firms, as there are several thousand publicly held 
corporations in which major shareholders control the board 
of directors. Conrad [1976] and Eisenberg [1969] have 
suggested for the several hundred largest industrial firms 
the board of directors is likely to be more responsive to 
managers than to the shareholders, but for the thousands 
of smaller firms the reverse is likely to be true. For 
this reason, this research focuses on Fortune 500 
Industrial firms, and its validity does not extend beyond 
these very large publicly traded firms. 
The research proceeds in three phases. Phase one is 
oriented around construction of a model. This model is 
useful for this research, and it will also enable other 
researchers to examine measurable board attributes and 
classify the board as either managerial dominated or 
pluralistic. Harrigan [1983] identified a common problem 
in policy research of focusing on measures of independent 
variables that may be too fine to be meaningful in a broad 
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based macro level research project. She suggests 
aggregating measures to create more coarse measures to 
improve both validity and reliability. Phase one of this 
project, the construction of a model of two board 
categories, seeks to achieve this coarse measure. It also 
allows testing of two extreme archetypes of board form. 
Phase two is the examination of the relationship 
between the two extreme board archetypes and measures of 
the firm’s financial and social performance. 
Statistically, the model in phase one was created by using 
confirmatory factor analysis to verify the existence of 
boards that could be identified as the managerial 
dominated or pluralistic archetypes, with the results of 
this factor analysis used to create a discriminant model. 
The testing in the second phase of relationships of 
financial and social performance is done with multiple 
analysis of variance and a Chi square test, respectively. 
Phase three of the research breaks away from the 
analysis being driven by the two archetypes, reverting to 
a more traditional analysis of non aggregated variables. 
In this phase statistical regression techniques are used 
to determine which board attributes are significantly 
related to superior financial or social performance. Ihis 
6 
analysis is used to develop an interpretive aggregation of 
the attributes, and relate these to alternative archetypes 
of boards of directors. 
Bac kg round 
There are three legally recognized units of the 
corporation; the shareholders, the board of directors and 
the officers [Conrad, 1976]. While the shareholders 
legally own the corporation, it is the board of directors 
that is legally recognized as responsible for the 
management of the corporation. Corporate charters granted 
by the various states assign the responsibility of 
management to the board of directors, who may choose the 
degree to which responsibilities are delegated to officers 
and professional management. The board is elected by the 
owners of the firm to carry out these tasks. 
The specific interrelationship between these three 
legally recognized units is described by the Model 
Business Corporation Act. This Act has been developed by 
the American Bar Association to establish an "ideal" 
corporation law. Many states have used the Model Business 
Corporation Act as a foundation for modernizing antiquated 
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corporate laws, and it can be referred to as a guide to 
modern corporate law [Kline, 1978]. The Act specifies the 
relationship between the three units. 
The shareholders meet annually and to vote on matters 
that properly come before the shareholders. The board of 
directors is charged with the overall management of the 
business and affairs of the corporation, unless otherwise 
provided for within the articles of incorporation or 
corporate by-laws. The board of directors has the 
responsibility to recommend changes in the articles of 
incorporation and the corporate by-laws to the 
shareholders at the annual meeting. It also makes 
recommendations to the shareholders on issues such as 
mergers or dissolution of the corporation. Officers of 
the corporation are elected by the board of directors, and 
have such responsibilities as delegated by the board of 
directors, or as provided by the corporate by-laws. 
The Model Business Corporation Act clarifies the 
relationship between shareholders, the board of directors 
and corporate officers. When the corporate form of 
organization was originated each corporation was granted a 
separate charter by the state legislature. I he transition 
from individually granted legislative charters to 
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legislatively authorized administrative charters has 
maintained the concept of the three separate legal units 
of the corporation. The issue of overall control of the 
corporation is related to the size of the firm and 
concentration of stock ownership. In the thousands of 
smaller publicly held firms the shareholders continue to 
have predominant control of the corporation and the board 
of directors [Conrad, 1976; Eisenberg, 1969]. 
Such is not the case for the few hundred largest 
industrial firms in the United States. Over the years the 
growing complexity and size of corporations has led to the 
separation of ownership and control, concurrent with the 
demise of owner-capitalism and the growth of 
manageria1-capita 1ism [Berle and Means, 1967; Chandler, 
1977]. Owners are theoretically interested in maximizing 
their investment, either in terms of dividends or stock 
appreciation. These owners may also be willing to trade 
off some of their potential profit maximization for 
generating certain amounts of social amenities by the 
corporation. There is, however, no reason to assume that 
professional managers have the same orientation. 
Management of these few hundred largest corporations has 
been seen as focusing on long term stability and steady 
9 
growth over short term profits, occasionally sacrificing 
social amenities to achieve these goals [Chandler, 1977; 
Stone, 1975; Best and Connolly, 1982]. 
Others argue that the corporation has a 
responsibility beyond those of satisfying shareholders or 
managers. This argument is based upon recognition of the 
corporation as a social institution, granted a charter by 
one of the various states. As such the corporation exists 
by permission of the society, and it must therefore 
consider the social implications of its decisions [Dooley, 
1969; Stone, 1975; Brudney, 1982; Hurst, 1982]. The board 
of directors is the appropriate focal point to resolve 
these differing perspectives. It is the focal point where 
the management meets the shareholders, with the 
shareholders electing a board to represent their 
interests, make appropriate strategic decisions trading 
off profit and social amenities and hire a management team 
that will operate in a manner consistent with these 
interests. 
Many authors have suggested this is pure folly; 
boards of directors of very large industrial firms are 
controlled by management through the nominating process to 
the board, or by constructing a board that is so 
• 10 
fragmented any consistent perspective [i.e. management] 
will be the one to which board members most easily agree 
[Berle and Means, 1967; Mace, 1971; Stone, 1975]. Others 
have argued boards exist in their present form because it 
minimizes agency cost, providing the most efficient manner 
for owners to exert the degree of control they wish over 
their corporation [Fama and Jensen, 1983]. A similar 
perspective is that the directors’ overriding standard is 
to create and protect the economic value of the firm [Aram 
and Cowen, 1983 ] . 
Boards may construct themselves in a wide variety of 
structural and compositional designs. The manner in which 
a board designs itself is under its control. Even if a 
skeletal design is outlined in the bylaws of the 
corporation, the board can recommend, and probably get, 
shareholder approval of a modified design. If a skeletal 
design is not present in the corporate bylaws, the board 
may make changes with a simple vote of the board itself. 
This leads to boards in differing corporations having 
vastly different structure and compositions. 
The question arises as to the relation between the 
board form [structure and composition] of very large 
industrial corporations and the firm’s performance. It 
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there is no relationship, why be concerned with board form 
at all? If the board form is not related to the 
performance of the organization, discussions of 
reformulating the board become superfluous. If there is a 
relationship, it would be beneficial to understand the 
relationship between board form and superior financial or 
social performance. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW and PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review 
The board of directors, as the unit of the 
corporation legally recognized to carry out the management 
function, must take responsibility for the overall 
corporate performance. Because the board may organize 
itself in almost any manner it chooses, it is relevant to 
ask how the board can organize itself to maximize this 
per f ormance. 
The board can not shirk this responsibility. As 
Greenough and Chapman point out [1981:924]: 
The primary task in running American 
corporations is to make them dynamic and 
productive. Unless the corporation itself is 
viable, all other governance objectives - for 
example, greater responsiveness to environmental 
concerns, civil rights, safety and social needs 
- will avail little. A primary function of 
. directors in the future will be to attend 
to the main job of running the corporation, 
producing a dependable and worthwhile product, 
and making a profit, while also trying to see 
that important social and environmental goals 
are achieved . 
12 
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Boards have a responsibility to organize in a manner that 
will facilitate this high level of corporate performance. 
Others have also recognized this responsibility. 
Conrad [1976] identifies three objectives of the board of 
directors. First, the board must be responsive to the 
Chief Executive Officer, offering a diverse group of well 
qualified people to celebrate the CEO's successes and to 
criticize his failures. Second, the board must represent 
the interests of all corporate stakeholders, whether they 
are shareholders or other groups with legitimate interests 
in corporate decisions. Third, the board must distinguish 
between the interests of the shareholders and 
stakeholders, as opposed to the interests of the 
professional management. 
Eisenberg [1969] identifies four principal tasks of 
the board of directors. First, the board must provide 
advice and counsel to the Chief Executive Officer. Second, 
it must authorize major corporate actions. Third, it is 
the appropriate point for the interests of corporate 
stakeholders other than management to be represented. 
Fourth, it must select, evaluate and remove the Chief 
Executive Officer. 
Both the Business Roundtable [1978] and the American 
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Bar Association [1978] have produced documents suggesting 
appropriate responsibilities, duties, functions and 
composition of boards of directors. The two documents 
have many similarities. Both recognize the importance of 
the economic viability of the corporation and the 
necessity for profit, but also stress the role of the 
board in assuring corporate decisions are consistent with 
the norms and standards of society. The two documents 
concur on the boards' responsibility for selecting, 
evaluating and removing top level corporate officers, 
approving corporate financial plans and assuring 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both 
also endorse the concept of each board being composed of a 
majority of outside members, although the Business 
Roundtable rejects the notion that there should be no 
inside directors other than the CEO. Both also soundly 
reject the notion of having directors representative of 
some particular special interest group. These special 
interest directors are often referred to as constituency 
directors . 
While several pieces of empirical research have been 
done on the relationship between board form and financial 
performance, only theoretical pieces have been developed 
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on the relationship between board composition and 
structure and the corporation's social performance. 
Recognizing that boards of directors of large industrial 
firms are generally not made up of major shareholders but 
rather individuals who bear only fiduciary responsibility, 
empirical research and conceptual studies have suggested 
particular board forms are related to superior financial 
or social performance. 
Financial Performance 
The first empirical research on the relationship 
between board structure and financial performance was done 
by Stanley Vance in 1955. In this work Vance did a 
cross-industry study to determine if dominance by inside 
directors [i.e. persons who were part of the management 
structure] or dominance by outside directors would be 
associated with superior financial performance. He tound 
a positive relationship between dominance by inside 
directors and various measures of financial performance. 
Vance did a follow up study in 1968 in which he used 
broader measures of financial performance. tn this study 
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he found a positive relationship between dominance by 
inside directors and six growth measures and five 
productivity measures. 
Lanser, in a 1969 PhD dissertation at Stanford, 
studied how board composition related to survival of new 
corporations. He found that firms including accommodation 
directors on the newly formed board had lower survival 
rates. Accommodation directors were defined as persons 
who had specific interests in the firm’s decisions, based 
upon their outside and primary affiliation. Such 
accommodation directors would be such persons as the new 
firm’s corporate banker, attorney, etc. 
Pfeffer [1972] studied the relationship between board 
composition and the organization's environment. Among 
other findings were indications of an optimum 
inside/outside director balance, depending upon the 
industry in which the firm competed. This optimum balance 
was a function of the firm’s need to tap capital markets. 
Firms in more capital intensive industries had a need to 
place more representatives of the capital markets on their 
boards to assure adequate information on capital sources. 
Firms that deviated from these optimums were found to have 
poorer financial performance. 
17 
Schmidt, in a 1974 PhD dissertation at New York 
University, found no statistically significant relation 
between the ratio of inside/outside directors and 
financial performance for firms in the chemical industry. 
All of these studies concentrated on defining the 
board by its balance of inside/outside directors. 
Crail, in a 1977 PhD dissertation from the the 
University of Cincinnati, took a broader view of boards of 
directors. Including not only the inside/outside balance, 
but also the occupational and educational background of 
directors, she found that occupational background was 
related to return on investment. Dr. Crail took this to 
indicate firms that selected outside board members whose 
occupational background complemented the inside directors 
were associated with superior financial performance. 
Vance, in a 1978 study, sought to expand his previous 
work by including more refined measures of board 
composition. In this cross industry study of forty firms 
he found those firms with boards dominated by inside 
directors had superior financial performance, particularly 
if the inside directors had technical or managerial 
expertise. In contrast, those firms with the poorest 
financial performance had few inside directors, and a 
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strong representation of outside business qualified 
directors or special interest directors representing a 
particular constituency. He found little impact on 
financial performance when boards had a broad social 
representation or public directors as part of their 
membership. 
In a 1978 study Herman found boards that were 
controlled by owner-managers had superior return on 
investment and return on equity when compared to boards 
controlled by inside managers. 
A 1983 study done by Pearce examined the internal 
versus external orientation of the firm’s dominant 
strategic planning coalition. The assumption that placing 
outside directors on the board would enhance a firm’s 
external environmental scanning and create an external 
orientation was found to be erroneous. Further, it was 
not possible to predict a board member's internal versus 
external orientation based on whether the member was an 
inside or outside director. The research also indicated 
that firms with an internal orientation were associated 
with higher levels of financial performance than firms 
with an external orientation. 
There seems to be little consistent evidence on how 
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board composition relates to financial performance. While 
Vance has found consistent evidence of a positive 
relationship between inside domination and good financial 
performance, others have failed to replicate these 
findings. One weakness with all of these approaches may 
be the use of too fine a measure of board characteristics 
[Harrigan, 1983], Evidence indicates simply looking at the 
balance of inside./outside directors may give a misleading 
picture of the board's relationship to corporate 
performance. Even Crail's inclusion of occupational and 
educational background took these measures independently 
of one another. This research uses a broader measure of 
board form to test the relationship of the board of 
directors to financial performance of the firm. 
Social Performance 
No empirical work has been done on the actual 
relationship between board structure and composition and 
the firm's social performance. While there have been many 
perspectives about the meaning of "social performance for 
firms, no one has actually investigated if evidence exists 
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supporting the premise that a reformulation of the 
corporate board will yield different corporate social 
behavior. There are two reasons for this. First, there 
is limited agreement as to what constitutes socially 
responsible behavior; it is a difficult measure to 
operationalize. Measures of social performance that have 
been developed are chronologically static; they could not 
readily be adapted to other time periods. Since public 
disclosure of board structure and composition is a 
relatively recent occurance, there has not been a merging 
of these two data bases for research purposes. Second, 
some theorists have claimed socially responsible behavior 
of a firm should be confined to maximizing financial 
performance and making efficient use of scarce resources 
[Friedman, 1962]. If we accept this perception of socially 
responsible behavior, it is moot to investigate social 
performance separately from financial performance. 
Not all economists agree with the Nobel Laureate. 
Dooley, writing in the American Economic Review [1969:322] 
described the board composition affecting social 
performance: 
The performance of outside local business 
leaders on the board of directors must also 
force management to consider the interests of 
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the local community, both in terms of its 
economic growth and in terms of its social and 
political development ..... Thus . [the 
firm’s] autonomy [within society] increases as 
management control over the board of directors 
increases, for then management can isolate 
itself from other points of view. 
Dooley disagrees with Friedman, citing the need for the 
board and its management structure to be cognizant of the 
broader social environment. 
Stone [1975] develops a strong thesis that 
corporations do not act in a socially responsible manner. 
He develops several suggestions that would lead to 
corporate decisions that were more consistent with the 
wellbeing of society, one of which is reformulation of the 
board of directors. Stone recommends a reformed board 
composition and structure having these characteristics: 
Outside directors. The board should be dominated by 
outside non-managerial directors. It would be ideal if 
there were no inside directors permitted. 
Public directors. A board composed partially of 
public directors appointed by the President with consent 
of the Congress. Public directors are defined as 
individuals who have been appointed as representatives of 
special interest groups other than owners. Generally they 
have full voice in the board proceedings. One of their 
major functions is to issue a statement as part of the 
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corporation's annual report, indicating the effectiveness 
of the corporation in carrying out its responsibilities as 
a socially chartered organization [Crispo, 1983]. Public 
directors could be removed for cause by the board to which 
they were appointed, but their presence and loyalty to 
organizations outside of the corporation on whose board 
they serve will generate greater objectivity and social 
awareness within the board. 
Independent nominating committee. Existence of an 
independent nominating committee to select non-public 
director candidates for election by the shareholders of 
the firm. This independent nominating committee would be 
obligated to consider independent nominations made by the 
shareholders . 
A separate board staff. This board staff, 
independent of the managerial staff, would have full 
access to corporate records and communications. The 
separate staff would facilitate more accurate and timely 
information flows to the board, making it difficult for 
the managers to manipulate board processes through 
information control. 
Elimination of joint Chairman/CEO. The leadership of 
the corporation in the persons of the Chairman and the 
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Chief Executive Officer would be held by two individuals, 
rather than only one. The CEO would be the only inside 
director allowed, and it would be unacceptable for the 
Chairman of the Board to also serve as Chief Executive 
Officer. This would maintain separation of the governance 
structure and the management structure. 
An active board. Creation of a "working board" that 
functions on a nearly full time basis would be the norm. 
Directors would dedicate major portions of their time to 
the governance of the firm, rather than attend the 
infrequent board meetings as is now the case. Creation of 
such a working board would be evidenced by a formal board 
structure with committees, frequent meetings, and a 
composition of directors who were not heavily committed to 
other professional obligations. 
Stone believes such board reforms would lead to 
greater social responsibility on the part of large 
American corporations. 
Many of Stone's ideas were incorporated into the 
Corporate Democracy Act of 1980. This act, which did not 
become law, provided for board reform with the goal of 
making boards more pluralistic, in the hope this would 
result in increased corporate social responsibility. I he 
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act required corporations to make several reforms. A 
summary of important portions of the act follows [Green, 
Marlin, Kamber, and Bernstein, 1982:7]. 
Title I -- Directors and Shareholders. To 
establish an "independent", "constituency" board 
of directors, candidates for which are nominated 
by a nominating committee and shareholders and 
elected by individual shareholders. To provide 
for independent audit and compensation 
committees, for public policy and law compliance 
committees, for cumulative voting and for inside 
and outside lawyers and auditors reporting 
illegal or probable illegal firm actions to the 
board . 
Title II -- Corporate Disclosure. To 
increase the flow of information to consumers, 
shareholders and workers about employment 
patterns, environmental matters, job health and 
safety, foreign production, directorial 
performance, shareholder ownership, tax rates 
and legal and auditing fees. 
Title III -- Community Impact Analysis. To 
require 24 month pre-notification if a 
substantial local employer plans to relocate or 
close down, to provide severance benefits to 
cushion the burden to abandoned employees and to 
make available federal assistance to workers who 
attempt to buy such facilities. 
Title IV -- 'Constitutional' Rights of 
Employees. To prohibit affected firms from 
discriminating against or discharging employees 
for the exercise of 'constitutional', civil or 
legal rights, or other unjust cause. 
Title V -- Interlocking Directorates. To 
prohibit anyone from being the director of more 
than two corporations under this Act. 
The similarities with Stone's proposed reformulation 
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of the board of directors is evident. It is also evident 
that the premise of the act is that creating a more 
pluralistic board of directors will cause the corporation 
to better serve society. 
As an alternative to legal or regulatory changes, 
Harold M. Williams, former Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, recommended voluntary alterations in 
the composition of corporate boards. Williams [1978] 
recommended that the CEO be the only inside director, and 
that other directors be classified as management, 
affiliated, nonmanagement or independent to inform 
shareholders of the background of outside directors. 
Although the SEC proposed specific rules for these 
classifications, the rules were dropped due to the 
difficuty of properly identifying directors as management, 
affiliated, nonmanagement or independent. 
Brudney [1982] again hypothesized that the increase 
in outside independent directors will positively affect 
corporate social performance. 
The philosophical foundation for relating board 
composition and structure to corporate social performance 
is set. However, the empirical test of these treatises 
has not been done. While many have suggested a more 
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pluralistic, less managerial dominated board will lead to 
improved social performance, no one has demonstrated such 
a relationship exists, much less a causal relationship. 
Archetypes of Boards of Directors 
Various authors have identified different archetypes 
of boards based on different interpretations, including 
the board structure, the board composition and the board 
interaction with other groups. These archetypes provide 
useful means to interpret combinations of board 
attributes, and to specify certain categories of boards 
that may be useful in testing hypotheses or analyzing the 
relationship between board archetype and corporate 
performance. Archetype boards of directors have been 
defined by Vance [1983], Bazerman and Schoorman [1983], 
Molz [forthcoming] and Lynch [1979]. 
Vance's typology. Vance [1983] identified boards as 
constitutional, consultive, collegial or communal, based 
on the purpose the board served within the organization. 
CONSTITUTIONAL BOARDS exist only to fulfill a legal 
requirement that a board exist, and typically take little 
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or no action in the governance of the firm. Power 
typically gravitates to the Chief Executive Officer, who 
usually also holds the title Chairman of the Board. This 
type can be further broken down into a proprietary boards 
or syndical boards. Proprietary boards exist when a 
founder-owner-manager controls and dominates the 
enterprise, relinquishing no real power to the board other 
than to corporate officers who, while serving at the 
pleasure of the founder-owner-manager, sit on the board. 
Syndical boards are those controlled by directors with 
substantial financial interests in the firm, but who 
refrain from active management. In syndical boards the 
Chief Executive Officer is granted a great deal of power 
and control, but serves only at the pleasure of those 
holding the shareholder control of the firm. 
CONSULTIVE BOARDS continue to have a dominant CEO, 
but also have significant confederates present on the 
board. These confederates may be corporate officers who 
also sit on the board, or outside directors. In either 
case the confederate directors offer technical assistance, 
buyer-seller contacts, or legal, financial or political 
advice. The CEO or Chairman may lead the board, but the 
board is not controlled by the Chairman/CEO. Confederates 
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offer expert advice and external contacts. 
COLLEGIAL BOARDS exist when a corporation has broadly 
diffused public ownership. Strong countervailing power 
groups are represented on the board, and the boards 
resolve matters with open debate over perceptions and 
value assessments. Collegial boards meet frequently, 
twelve or more times per year. 
COMMUNAL BOARDS are not relevant to private 
corporations, but are found frequently in quasi-political 
situations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, Conrail 
or the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Membership on 
these boards are frequently sensitive to shifts in elected 
political positions, and may function primarily to assure 
the political program of the party in power is 
operationalized within the organization. 
Bazerman and Schoorman's typology. Bazerman and 
Schoorman [1983] identified five types of boards, based 
upon the group to which the board was responsive. The 
five types were managerial, financial, class hegemony, 
reciprocity and multilevel limited rationality. 
MANAGERIAL BOARDS are those dominated and controlled 
by professional managers. As such, the■board is primarily 
responsive to the objectives of the professional 
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managers. This process is usually characterized by 
managers holding inside director positions on the board, 
and the Chairman/CEO being a product of upward movement 
through the well defined managerial hierarchy. 
FINANCIALLY CONTROLLED BOARDS are those dominated by 
significant suppliers of capital to the firm. These may 
be major outside shareholders, representatives of 
commercial banks or representatives of investment banking 
establishments. The board serves primarily to assure the 
assets invested by these financial representatives are 
protected, and a suitable return is generated to continue 
the investment. 
CLASS HEGEMONY BOARDS are those that rely on an "old 
boy" network to provide corporate directors. This network 
represents an elite class within society; one that is 
characterized by hereditary wealth, membership in elite 
clubs and attendance at exclusive preparatory schools or 
universities. Such boards are associated with maintaining 
the status quo, and consideration for other members of the 
class who may not hold a seat on the board. Such a board 
might refrain from pursuing a takeover attempt if it could 
not be carried off amicably, as an unfriendly attempt 
might violate the norms of the elite class. 
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RECIPROCITY BOARDS are similar to Vance’s consultive 
board. Again, such a board would offer technical 
assistance, buyer-seller contacts, or legal, financial or 
political advice, but in Bazerman and Schoorman ' s typology 
these contacts would be primarily external to the 
corporation. The incentive for such interaction is 
mutually beneficial exchange, with both parties gaining in 
some manner. The outside board members would gain 
benefits that would accrue to the organization they 
represent . 
MULTILEVEL LIMITED RATIONALITY BOARDS are based on a 
notion of economic utility maximization for each board 
member, wherein he or she makes decisions maximizing his 
or her complex utility function. This complex utility 
function includes personal, social or confederate 
organzation objectives. These boards would be assumed to 
be structured and composed in a manner that reflects the 
aggregate utility functions of the individual directors. 
Such boards would likely be similar to Vance ’s collegial 
board, particularly in the process of developing board 
structure and composition. 
Molz’ typology. Molz [forthcoming] identified seven 
types of boards, focusing on the board's relation to 
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control in the organization. The seven types were 
managerial, review and approve, control by exception, 
normative, strategic, shareholder and social. 
MANAGERIAL CONTROL occurs when the management of the 
firm dominates the board of directors, either through 
outright membership on the board, control of nominations 
to the board or through information flows to the board. 
The management controls the board through composition 
directly or by selectively providing and withholding 
information relevant to making timely corporate 
decisions. 
REVIEW AND'APPROVE CONTROL occurs when the board has 
power to review and approve corporate policies and 
strategies submitted by the management. The board does 
not initiate any enterprise or corporate strategy, but 
simply acts as a yes-no or go-no go decision point. 
CONTROL BY EXCEPTION is a variation of review and 
approve control. Under control by exception the board 
would make most decisions on a review and approve basis, 
but under cataclysmic conditions the board would take 
independent action. The most frequent occuranee of such 
action is in the termination of the Chief Executive 
Officer. Such dismissals are rare, however, and the 
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management maintains rather solid control of the board. 
NORMATIVE CONTROL occurs when the board maintains the 
responsibility of determining corporate goals and 
objectives in a normative sense. The board does not make 
operational or strategic decisions, delegating these to 
the professional management. The board is in control of 
the organization. In a very real sense the board carries 
out the governance function and the professional 
management carries out the management function. 
STRATEGIC CONTROL occurs when the board exerts not 
only normative control, but also involves itself in the 
strategic management functions, making specific decisions 
on how the normative goals of the organization are carried 
out. In this archetype the board has control over the 
entire firm. Professional management is relegated to an 
operational decision level, making no significant 
decisions on corporate goals or objectives on a strategic 
or normative level. 
SHAREHOLDER CONTROL exists when major shareholders 
have control of the board, either through direct board 
membership or through control of shareholder proxies. The 
professional management serves at the pleasure of the 
major shareholders, who hold decisive control of the 
• 33 
corporation. The major shareholders, may however, elect 
to hold this control in reserve, delegating much of the 
strategic, operational and possibly even the normative 
control to professional managers. Such delegation would 
continue only as long as the professional managers made 
decisions consistent with the wishes of the major 
shareholders who control the board. 
SOCIAL CONTROL is the opposite extreme of managerial 
control, and is best described by Green, Marlin, Kamber 
and Bernstein [1982], and Stone [1975], In social control 
the board is structured and composed to be representative 
of many significant stakeholders in the corporation, 
including consumers, neighbors, minorities, unions and 
owners. The board is a very active, working board with 
frequent meetings, an independent professional staff, 
access to all operational decisions and information and an 
elaborate committee structure. Professional management 
control is very limited, and ownership control has been 
subordinated to control, by other stakeholders in corporate 
performance. 
Lynch 1s "activated* board. In an extensive case 
study of two firms seeking to make more active use of 
their boards of directors, Lynch described the process and 
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results of creating an "activist' board. Such a board was 
seen as an alternative to the managerial dominated board 
as described by Bazerman and Schoorman [1983] or Molz 
[forthcoming], or the constitutional board described by 
Vance [1983]. The activated board is characterized by the 
following attributes: 
SEPARATION OF BOARD GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL 
LEADERSHIP. This would be accomplished by having separate 
persons serving as Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer. Such separation would facilitate the 
board focusing on a governing role, asking discerning and 
probing questions of the professional management, and the 
board taking an active part in making normative corporate 
policy . 
AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS. 
Having well qualified outside directors would enable the 
firms to have a broader input into its upper level 
environmental scanning process, and bring an independence 
to the boardroom. However, outsiders should be prepared 
to spend substantial amounts of time on their duties as 
corporate directors. The directors' posit.ion on an 
activated board is not honorary or to merely confirm the 
decisions of professional management, but rather to 
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actively formulate corporate goals and objectives. 
FREQUENT BOARD MEETINGS. The activated board is a 
working board. It meets frequently on a formal basis, and 
even more frequently informally through tele-conferences, 
or directors and managers meeting together for informal 
discussions . 
AN ELABORATE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE. The activated 
working board is facilitated by having an elaborate 
committee structure, including a nominating committee, 
audit committee, compensation committee and other relevant 
committees. Such a committee structure promotes 
information flows to the board, enables the board to have 
specialist members among the outside directors and 
facilitates the board’s questioning and probing process of 
corporate decision making. 
A DECISION MAKING BOARD. The activated board makes 
decisions of a substantive nature. It does not rely on 
professional managers to make presentations to the board, 
with predefined decisions already in place for board 
ratification. Rather the board is a decision making 
forum, characterized by multiple perspectives, values, 
questioning, probing and discussion. The result is an 
active board that makes important corporate decisions. 
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While some similarities may be drawn between these 
four perspectives of board composition and structure, 
their primary usefulness in this research is development 
of board archetypes that can be used to define board forms 
to be modeled in phase one of the research and tested for 
relation to corporate performance in phase two. The 
different archetypes are used to describe those boards 
found most effective in phase three. 
Problem Development 
The relation of board form [composition and 
structure] to the firm's performance has not been clear!y 
demonstrated in prior research. The many archetypes of 
boards, all based on aggregation of attributes into a 
board with definable characteristics, suggest the need for 
broader based research. The work done relating board 
composition and structure to financial performance is 
contradictory, and is based on only a few attributes. 
Superior performance has not been related to any 
aggregated board archetype. 
Further, the lack of empirical work investigating the 
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relation between board form and social performance has 
encouraged social theorists to suggest legal reforms, such 
as the Corporate Democracy Act of 1980. Such new laws 
would force major changes in the nature of corporate 
governance, creating more pluralistic boards, but with no 
evidence the desired changes in corporate social 
responsibility would follow. 
Recent evidence indicates boards are voluntarily 
moving away from managerial dominated boards toward more 
pluralist forms [Christie, 1983; Ellig, 1983; Moser, 
1983]. Without clear evidence such moves will enhance the 
firm's financial or social performance the wisdom of such 
a general movement is open to question. 
These factors are the basis of this research. By 
aggregating measurable attributes of board structure and 
composition into a model that will allow broader 
interpretation of boards into two categories, the above 
problems can be addressed in a more rigorous manner. 
Two hypothesis will be tested in this research: 
HOI Firms having managerial dominated boards will 
have superior financial, performance. 
H02 Firms having pluralistic boards will have 
superior social performance. 
The operational definitions of managerial boards. 
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pluralistic boards, financial performance and social 
performance are located in the next chapter. 
After examing the results of the testing of the 
hypothesis, the next logical question is, MIs there some 
other archetypical board of directors that is associated 
with even more superior corporate performance?". This 
question is investigated in the third phase of the 
research project, when specific attributes associated with 
superior performance are fit into board archetypes. 
In doing this research some important qualifications 
need to be addressed. First, there is no claim of 
causality between board archetype and the firm's 
performance, although it is implied in all of the 
literature. The limited resources available for this 
research prevented tests for causality; the causal 
direction could go either way [Gupta and Govindarajan , 
1984]. The question of causation is important and worthy 
of future research. However, before causal research 
becomes a reasonable objective a relationship between the 
proposed dependent and independent variables must be 
demonstrated. Without this relationship the study of 
causation is moot. 
Second, this proposal is investigating very broad, 
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macro levels of the firm. There are many intervening 
variables between board form and the firm’s performance. 
This proposed study makes an effort to control for the 
most obvious and important intervening variables, but the 
sheer number of such variables demands they be 
acknowledged as present. The use of the coarse measure of 
board type, to be developed in Phase I of this project, is 
one effort to incorporate some of the more obvious 
intervening variables into the analysis. Similarily, the 
models developed in phase three will have limited 
explanatory power over the corporations performance 
levels, due to these intervening variables. 
Third, this study is one of the relationship of the 
composition and structure of the board of directors to 
corporate performance. The above literature suggests such 
a relationship exists. The manner these structural and 
compositional elements are manifested in the sociological 
interaction of the board is beyond the scope of this 
research. It may be concluded that changes in the 
structure and composition will be accompanied by changes 
in the sociological interaction, but the interaction 
itself is not a focus of this research. 
Fourth, this research is static, observing measurable 
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attributes of board form and corporate social and 
financial performance for only one time period, 1982. 
While corporate boards are generally quite stable from 
year to year, the limited availability of data prior to 
1982 made a more dynamic study impossible. The static 
nature of the study further reduces causal inferences 
appropriate with a longitudinal research project. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
The objective of understanding the relationship 
between board structure and composition and corporate 
performance was addressed in three phases. The phases 
were, [1] to develop a model capable of discriminating 
between managerial dominated boards and pluralistic 
boards, [2] use this model to test the two hypotheses, and 
[3] to investigate which attributes of composition and 
structure best match the characteristics of financial and 
social performance, and match these attributes with a 
board archetype. 
Phase One - Building a Discriminant Model 
Construction of the model 
The first phase of the research involved creating a 
model that could be used to classify boards of directors 
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into two categories, based upon measurable attributes. 
The objective was to create a model that could be used to 
discriminate between boards without requiring researcher 
input into the categorization. The model discriminates 
between two types of boards: managerial dominated and 
pluralistic. The model will discriminate on the basis of 
how attributes load on the two types of boards, thereby 
creating an operational definition that is theory driven. 
Conceptually the managerial dominated board is analogous 
to Vance’s [1983] constitutional board or the managerial 
boards described by Molz [forthcoming] and Bazerman and 
Schoorman [1983]. The pluralist model is most analogous to 
Vance’s collegial board or Lynch’s [1979] activated 
board. The model is not data specific, but rather it is a 
genuine model in the sense it can be used for future 
research requiring board categorization. Further, the 
data used to create the model was independent of the data 
used to test the hypotheses. 
Theorists have suggested that boards of directors can 
be differentiated on the basis of several compositional 
and structural attributes. Using confirmatory factor 
analysis these attributes were analyzed to determine the 
existence of the two board types. The initial factor 
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analysis confirmed the existence of managerial dominated 
and pluralistic boards. From this each case was 
classified as representing a pluralistic or managerial 
board, and this information was used as input into a 
discriminant analysis. The result is a discriminant model 
that can classify other boards as managerial or 
pluralistic . 
One difficulty in doing a broad-based study of boards 
of directors is access to information. The literature 
suggests the following attributes are constructs that can 
indicate the degree of pluralism or managerial control 
within a board. The attributes included in the analysis 
follow. The actual inclusion of each attribute into the 
final model was a function of the variability of the 
attribute, the significance it contributed to 
discriminating between the two board types, and the amount 
it was correlated with other variables. These attributes 
become the operational definition of managerial dominated 
and pluralistic boards. Except as noted on the final two 
attributes, data on each of the specific attributes were 
obtained from annual proxy statements. The specific 
attributes are: 
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Does the board have a single person who is both the 
Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer [CEO] of the 
firm? Firms that have the same individual filling both 
positions are interpreted most likely to be managerial 
dominated, and least likely to be pluralistic [Spencer, 
1983; Brown, 1976; Lynch, 1979; March, Maakestad and 
Heiland, [undated]; Ruder, 1981; Mace, 1972; Stone, 1975]. 
Abbreviated as CHCEO. 
Is there an outside dominated Nominating Committee? 
Firms that have committees are more likely to be working 
boards, and therefore less managerial dominated [S.E.C., 
1980; March, Maakestad and Heiland, [undated]; Vance, 
1983; Rrown, 1976; Herman, 1981]. Specifically, boards 
that have a nominating committee made up of outside 
directors are more likely to be independent of the 
Chairman/CEO, and are evidence of a pluralistic board 
[Vance, 1983; Brown, 1976; Bacon, 1981; Lynch, 1979; 
March, Maakestad and Heiland, [undated]; Greenough and 
Chapman, 1981; S.E.C., 1980; Palameri, 1979]. Abbreviated 
as NMOUT. 
Is there an outside dominated Social Responsibility 
Commit tee ? Recently, some firms have added a social 
responsibility committee. These committees can be taken 
to be an indication of a firm’s commitment to being 
responsive to broader social issues, and as such are 
characteristic of more pluralistic boards [Vance, 1983; 
Brown, 1976], Abbreviated as SROUT. 
What is the composition of the board? Background and 
affiliation of directors is further evidence of the 
category to which the board should be assigned. There are 
two classifications of directors that can be clearly and 
objectively identified: inside directors and outside 
directors. Inside directors are either current or former 
officers of the corporation. They are assumed to have 
primary allegiance to the management structure and as such 
would be expected to dominate a managerial controlled 
board. Outside directors are individuals who are not, and 
have not been, officers of the firm. A firm that has a 
majority of outside directors would be an indication of a 
pluralistic board [Lynch, 1979; Ruder, 1981; Koenig and 
Gogel, 1981; Mueller, 1982; Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; 
Vance, 1983; Stone, 1975; Mace, 1971; Brown, 1976; 
Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983; Schoorman, Bazerman and 
Atkin, 1981; Burt, 1980; Greenough and Chapman, 1981; 
Jones and Goldberg, 1982]. Abbreviated as BDOUT. 
How frequently does the board meet? Boards that meet 
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frequently are associated with active boards that are more 
involved in establishing goals and making decisions, while 
boards that meet infrequently are more likely to be 
ineffective and only in existence to confirm the decisions 
and policies of the top management. Thus, boards that 
meet rarely are associated with managerial dominated 
boards, while those that meet frequently are associated 
with more pluralistic boards [Brown, 1976; Stone, 1975; 
Lynch, 1979]. Abbreviated as NMTGS. 
What is the salary relationship between the highest 
paid officer and the second highest paid officer? The 
ratio of the salary of the highest paid officer to the 
second highest paid officer is an indication of the 
relative power of the highest paid officer [Albrecht and 
Jhin, 1978; Woo, 1983]. Thus, firms that have a high 
executive salary ratio are associated with managerial 
dominated boards, while firms that have a low executive 
salary ratio are associated with more pluralistic boards. 
Abbreviated as SLRTO. 
How much stock is held by the inside directors? If 
the inside directors own a major portion of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation, it would indicate a 
managerial dominated board; or at least that the managers 
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were also significant owners of the firm. The holding of 
large blocks of stock gives the managers not only 
managerial power, but also ownership power [Chandler, 
1977; Berle and Means, 1967, Molz, 1983]. Abbreviated as 
INNST. 
How much stock is held by outside directors? Outside 
directors who hold large blocks of stock are generally 
more independent of managers, particularly when compared 
to outside directors who hold only token amounts of 
stock. Individuals may hold the stock either directly, or 
indirectly through family trusts, corporations, 
foundations or similar means. The greater the percentage 
of outside directors holding large blocks of stock, the 
more pluralistic the board [Miller, 1983; Molz, 1983]. 
Abbreviated as OUTST. 
How many members of the board can be identified as 
minorities or women? Boards that are pluralistic are 
assumed to be representative of several identifiable 
groups in society. Boards having blacks or women members 
would show evidence of pluralism [Daly, 1983; Deloitte, 
Haskins and Sells, 1983; Wayne, 1983]. Abbreviated as 
MINOR. Data was obtained from annual reports, proxy 
statements and standard biographical sources. 
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How long has the Chairman/Chief Executive Officer 
held his position? Boards that are dominated by one 
individual are more frequently associated with managerial 
domination and control than with the openness and the give 
and take of a more pluralistic board. Thus boards that 
have one individual holding the most powerful position for 
long periods of time would be associated wj.th managerial 
boards [Chandler, 1977; Herman, 1981]. Abbreviated as 
TNURE. Data was obtained from annual proxy statements or 
Moody’s Industrial Manual. 
In phase one of the research these attributes were 
used with confirmatory factor analysis to determine if it 
was feasible to separate actual boards into more 
managerial dominated and pluralistic groups. In brief, 
the effort was statistically supported. Such dualism was 
found to exist; boards loaded positively or negatively on 
a factor that was consistent in being composed of 
attributes that, were identified as managerial [negative 
loadings] or pluralistic [positive loadings]. After the 
development of the confirmatory factor analysis, a factor 
loading was identified for each case. These factor 
loadings identified each case [board] as being more 
managerial or more pluralistic. These boards were used as 
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input into discriminant analysis to create a model that 
was used in phase two of the research to objectively 
identify boards as more managerial or more pluralistic. 
The discriminant model generated a discriminant 
classification function that can categorize boards as 
either pluralistic or managerial dominated, based on each 
board's composition and structure. This method was 
designed to separate boards using a theory driven 
concept. Obviously some boards identified as managerial 
might actually fall into Molz’ [forthcoming] 
classification as a review and approve board, or a control 
by exception board. Phase one and phase two use existing 
boards to test a theoretical hypothesis; the separation 
into two divergent board categories is intended to 
maximize their differences, not absolutely classify boards 
in a manner to preclude their identification as some other 
board type. To test the hypotheses a theory-based forced 
separation was necessary. 
The basic steps in phase one were as follows. 
Drawing of random sample. A random sample of 50 
Fortune 500 industrial firms was drawn from the the May 2, 
1983 listing of such firms. The firms were selected by 
matching their position on the Fortune list with numbers 
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from a random number table. These firms came from any 
industrial classifications and were used only to generate 
the discriminant model. For each firm an analysis was 
made of the structure and composition of the board of 
directors, based on public information contained in the 
firm's 1982 annual report, proxy statement and other 
relevant corporate material. 
Rescaling of data. Both factor analysis and 
discriminant analysis are sensitive to scale differences 
of the variables and their variance. That is, if one 
variable has a large range of variance or is scaled to 
have an order of magnitude greater than the other 
variables, these effects will cause distortion in the 
statistical, analysis [Goldstein and Dillon, 1983]. For 
these reasons each variable was rescaled for phase one of 
the research. The result was for each variable to have a 
range from 0 to 100. The dichotomous Chairman/CEO variable 
was scaled to be either 22 or 78, with 22 representing 
boards having an individual who was both the Chairman and 
CEO, while 78 was used to code firms having separate 
Chairman and CEO. These two numbers were chosen because 
they retained the dichotomous nature of the variable, and 
created a measure of variance that was similar to that ot 
the other variables. 
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Based on the theory and the nature of the attributes, 
Table 1 shows the actual range, standard deviation and 
skewness for each attribute after rescaling, and the 
method of coding each attribute. To facilitate ease in 
generating these initial classifications, attributes have 
been coded so all will be "low" when associated with a 
managerial dominated board. This was accomplished by 
coding some of the attributes with a negative 
relationship, while others were coded directly. Table 1 
identifies the coding scheme and characteristics of the 
data used to create the discriminant model. 
Descriptive statistics and review of variance. After 
each variable had been coded, descriptive statistics were 
generated. The objective was to assure the following: [1] 
that each variable was correctly rescaled to have a range 
between 0 and 100, [2] that the variances of each variable 
be approximately the same, so that one variable would not 
overpower the factor analysis or discriminant analysis due 
to very large variance relative to the other variables, 
[3] to examine the non-norma1ity of the distribution of 
each variable. The later of these three elements was 
needed primarily for informational purposes. Neither 
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TABLE 1 
MEASURABLE ATTRIBUTES,•DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND 
CODED RANGE OF MANAGERIAL AND PLURALISTIC BOARDS 







CHCEO YES/NO 24.18 1 . 13 22 OR 78 
NMOUT 0-100% 40.84 -0.37 0-100 
SROUT 0-100% 21.24 3.63 0-100 
BDOUT 23-91% 24.03 -0.55 0-100 
NMTGS 4-13/YR 33.06 -0.02 0-100 
SLRTO 1.00- 
2.76 24.29 -1.39 100-0 
INNST 0-46% 28.24 -1.77 100-0 
OUTST 0-31% 23.80 2.12 0-100 
MINOR 0-14% 34.80 0.06 0-100 
TNURE 1-46 YR 23.18 -1.80 100-0 
KEY 
CHCEO CHAIRMAN/CEO 
NMOUT NOMINATING COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
SROUT SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
BDOUT COMPOSITION, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
NMTGS FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS 
SLRTO SALARY RATIO 
INNST INSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
OUTST OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
MINOR % MINORITY MEMBERSHIP 
TNIJRE TENURE CHAIRMAN/CEO 
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factor analysis, when using a principal factoring method 
of factor extraction, nor discriminant analysis depend on 
a multivariate normal distribution for their use. Both, 
however, function better when the distribution approaches 
multivariate normal [Goldstein and Dillon, 1983], 
Information on the variance of each variable and its 
skewness is given in Table 1. Using standard deviation as 
a measure of variance showed a range of 21 to 35 for all 
of the variables except the measures of the nominating 
committee, which had a standard deviation of 40. 
Regression of each variable against all other 
variables. Each of the ten variables was independently 
regressed against each of the other nine variables. The 
objective was to obtain information on the relationship 
between variables. Variables that are highly correlated 
with several other variables are redundant and cause 
distortions when using discriminant analysis [Goldstein 
and Dillon, 1983]. Table 2 shows the correlations between 
each of the ten variables. The only variable deemed to be 
a problem in terms of correlation with other variables was 
the variable showing measures of the nominating committee, 
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Confirmatory factor analysis. Confirmatory factor 
analysis is a useful statistical tool when there is theory 
suggesting that measurable attributes are manifestations 
of some underlying source of the variance of the 
observable attributes [Kim, 1975; Goldstein and Dillon, 
1983]. In this case the underlying source is the nature of 
the board; whether it is more managerial dominated or more 
pluralistic. The existence of such an underlying 
dichotomy implies the possibility of extracting a factor 
i 
that has the measurable attributes load upon it consistent 
with the theory. The objective of this phase of the model 
building was to find a factor that met the needed 
specifications for statistical significance. 
The specifications needed for a statistically sound 
confirmation of the underlying sources of board 
orientation [i.e., whether the board was managerial 
dominated or pluralistic] were as follows: 
1. The attributes [variables] included in the analysis 
have a similar range of variance. 
2. The attributes [variables] included in the analysis 
not be correlated with more than three of the other 
attributes [variables] at a .10 probability level. 
Generation of a single factor that can be 3. 
interpreted consistent with managerial domination or 
pluralistic composition. This will require a factor 
in which all of the attributes of practical 
significance [i.e., variables with loadings over 
.30] load either positively or negatively on the 
factor [Goldstein and Dillon, 1983: 3-11]. A mixture 
of positive and negative loadings will not be 
interpretable, indicating it is not possible to 
identify boards as either managerial dominated or 
pluralistic . 
The confirmatory factor analysis was done using the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences [SPSS]. All of 
the attributes were entered with the exception of the 
measure of the nominating committee. This attribute was 
excluded because it had more variance than any of the 
other variables, and was significantly correlated with six 
of the other attributes. The remaining nine attributes 
were entered into the factor analysis program, which was 
ordered to generate one factor using the principal factor 
method with multiple iterations. The iterative process 
continues to add or delete variables until successive 
iterations do not offer an improved R Squared at a .001 
probability level. During the process each iteration 
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generates new estimates of communalities 
input in the next iteration [Kim, 1975]. 
generated after six iterations, with the 
i 
loadings shown in Table 3. 
that are used as 
The factor was 
factor matrix of 
TABLE 3 
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS LOADING 












NMOUT NOMINATING COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
SROUT SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
BDOUT COMPOSITION, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
NMTGS FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS 
SLRTO SALARY RATIO 
INNST INSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
OUTST OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
MINOR % MINORITY MEMBERSHIP 
TNURE TENURE CHAIRMAN/CEO 
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All of the variables of practical significance loaded 
positively on the factor, indicating the factor confirms 
the concept of using the variables in aggregate to 
identify a board as managerial or pluralistic. Boards 
loading positively on the factor can be identified as 
pluralistic, while those loading negatively can be 
identified as managerial dominated. 
Generate discriminant model. The objective of phase 
one of the research project was to construct a model 
capable of classifying boards as either managerial 
dominated or pluralistic. The confirmatory factor 
% 
analysis indicated this was a feasible objective. The 
last step was to generate a discriminant classification 
function that can be used in identifying boards of 
additional firms as either managerial dominated or 
pluralistic. 
The criteria for creating the discriminant model 
wer e: 
1. The model include several of the attributes 
[variables] in an appropriate mix. With nine 
attributes [variables] remaining in the analysis it 
was desired that most of the nine remain in the 
discriminant model, and that those not included not 
be deemed intuitively important. 
2. That the attributes included in the discriminant 
analysis load on the discriminant function 
consistent with the confirmatory factor analysis. 
3. That the function yield two separate groups of 
boards with the difference between groups being 
significant at the .05 level. 
4. That 95% of the initial cases be correctly 
identified by the discriminant model in a 
test/retest reliability check. 
The rescaled attributes of the initial 50 randomly 
selected boards were used as raw data input to the 
discriminant analysis. Each of the boards was classified 
as managerial dominated or pluralistic, depending on how 
it loaded on the factor of the confirmatory factor 
analysis. The nine attributes used in the factor analysis 
and the classification of each board were entered, and the 
program directed to generate a single discriminant 
function using Wilk's Criteria in a stepwise process. 
This process generated a function entering the specified 
nine variables in order of their overall contribution in 
maximizing the separation of the group centroids. This 
process maximizes the F ratio and minimizes Wilk’s lambda 
[Klecka, 1975]. 
The results of the discriminant classification 
satisfactorily met the criteria established for the 
model. 
Seven of the nine variables were included in the 
discriminant classification function. The two excluded 
[salary ratio and outside directors' stockholdings] were 
not significant in the confirmatory factor analysis, as 
would be expected. Of the seven included, the signs 
remained the same. The standardized canonical 
discriminant function coefficients are shown in Table 4. 
The centroids were 1.88794 for the pluralistic 
boards, and -1.74271 for the managerial dominated boards. 
This separation was significant at the .0000 level, and 




DISCRIMINANT CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION 

















NMOUT NOMINATING COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
SROUT SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
BDOUT COMPOSITION, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
NMTGS FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS 
SLRTO SALARY RATIO 
INNST INSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
OUTST OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
MINOR % MINORITY MEMBERSHIP 
TNURE TENURE CHAIRMAN/CEO 
Reliability and validity of the model 
The analysis of the model for reliability and 
validity was based on Kerlinger [1973], Cook and Campbell 
[1975] and Kidder [1982]. The development of the 
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discriminant model included the use of confirmatory factor 
analysis and discriminant analysis. Perhaps the 
overriding interpretation is simply that the model worked 
as planned even though three of the original ten 
attributes were eventually dropped from the model. The 
final model was able to successfully and consistently 
separate boards of directors into two groups; those that 
were more managerial dominated and those that were more 
pluralistic. The model is both reliable and valid. 
Reliabilit y. The discriminant model is reliable in 
that it is consistent, stable and accurate. The model was 
successful in correctly identifying cases, as indicated by 
the test/retest reliability check of comparing actual 
classification. All fifty of the cases were correctly 
predicted in the retest, indicating the reliability of the 
model [Klecka, 1975; Goldstein and Dillon, 1983], 
Construct Validity. The construct validity of the 
model is quite high. The attributes included in the 
analysis are all supported by either earlier empirical 
studies or through multiple theoretical and conceptual 
analyses. Both the confirmatory factor analysis and 
discriminant analysis had significant attributes load 
either positively or negatively as predicted by the theory 
of each attribute. The model has construct validity in 
its consistency with theory. 
Face Validity. The face validity of the model is also 
good. For example, Table 5 shows two boards that were 
about midway within their respective classification as 
managerial or pluralistic. 
While some of the attributes are juxtaposed from the 
purely theoretical development, the overall sensibility is 
evident. The fact that neither of these boards are 
extremely pluralistic or managerial dominated, but rather 
falling in the center of each respective group is also 
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DISCRIMINANT SCORE -1 .73 + 1.67 
CHAIRMAN IS CEO YES NO 
% OUTSIDERS ON 
NOMINATING COMMITTEE NO COMMITTEE 69% 
% OUTSIDERS ON 
SOC. RESP. COMMITTEE NO COMMITTEE 80% 
% OUTSIDERS ON BOARD 27% 61% 
NUMBER OF MEETINGS 10 7 
SALARY RATIO 1.19 1.02 
% TOTAL STOCK HELD 
BY INSIDE DIRECTORS 9% 2% 
% TOTAL STOCK HELD 
BY OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 0% 0% 
% MINORITIES ON BOARD 7% 6% 
TENURE OF CEO 13 YEARS 1 YEAR 
Statistical and Internal Validity. Statistical and 
internal validity are considered together in that the 
model was created solely through statistical analysis, so 
the internal validity is a function of its statistical 
validity. The model demonstrates both forms of validity 
through its construction. The confirmatory factor 
analysis was generated by requesting a single factor, so 
the factor explains 100% of the variance in the attributes 
of the original cases. The measure of statistical and 
internal validity is in the nature of the factor 
loadings. The factor generated demonstrated both forms of 
validity by having six attributes load upon it with 
statistical significance [Goldstein and Dillon, 1983]. If 
the factor analysis was not valid, it would have had only 
a few or no attributes load on it with statistical 
significance. 
The discriminant analysis demonstrates statistical 
and internal validity for the same reason. Over half of 
the included attributes loaded with statistical 
significance, and the model was able to correctly 
discriminate between the pluraliStic and managerial 
dominated boards of the original fifty cases. To this 
extent the reliability of the model is also an indication 
of its internal and statistical validity. 
External Validity. The external validity of the model 
is high, recalling that the population under consideration 
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are Fortune 500 Industrial firms. Within this population 
the validity of the model is high, in that the attributes 
were selected and coded to be independent of industry, age 
of firm or size. The size of the firm is a two-edged 
sword, in that smaller firms are more likely to be largely 
owned by a single person or family. This would show up as 
leaning toward managerial domination, which is logical 
when one considers such persons are usually heavily 
involved with the management of the firm. It is for this 
reason the research was limited to Fortune 500 Industrial 
firms; boards of directors of smaller firms are 
fundamentally different. 
The reliability and validity of the model have been 
demonstrated. The power of the model in classifying 
boards as managerial and pluralistic is evident, and it 
does so without human bias, rather depending on 
statistically accurate interpretations of measurable 
attributes. 
This completes the first phase of the research 
project; creating a reliable and valid discriminant model 
that can classify boards of directors into two 
categories. This discriminant model was used to test the 
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hypotheses in phase two of the research project. 
Phase Two - Hypotheses Testing 
In phase two of the research project two hypotheses 
were tested using the discriminant model generated in the 
first phase. Repeating the hypotheses: 
HOI Firms having managerial dominated boards 
will have superior financial performance. 
H02 Firms having pluralistic boards will have 
superior social performance. 
The method for testing each of these hypotheses is 
described below. 
Testing for financial performance 
The testing of the first hypothesis was done through 
drawing a sample of firms from a single industry from the 
Fortune 500 list, classifying the boards by category and 
using multiple analysis of variance to test the 
hypothesis. 
SAMPLE. The sample for testing for a relationship 
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between board category and financial performance was the 
57 firms from the food industry included in the Fortune 
500 list of industrial firms. Of the 57 firms in this 
grouping, 45 were usable in this project. Twelve firms 
were excluded from the analysis. These included [1] five 
firms that were co-operatives, making their financial 
performance and board composition and structure 
non-comparable with publicly held firms, [2] one was 
emerging from a proxy battle, with a very unstable board 
composition during 1982, [3] two were wholly owned 
subsidiaries of foreign multi-nationational firms that 
were not comparable to others in the population and [4] 
four had incomplete or inconsistent data. 
The food industry was selected for several reasons. 
First, the largest food firm [Dart and Kraft] is number 30 
on the Fortune list, while the smallest [Rath Packing] is 
number 490. This is a desirable range for this research, 
in that it covers nearly the entire Fortune 500 list. 
Second, the food industry is relatively stable, being 
less subject to fluctuations in the economy than some 
other industries such as mining and crude oil production, 
or metal manufacturing and processing. 
Third, by selecting only one industry an effort was 
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made to control for some of the extraneous factors that 
would effect financial performance in a cross industry 
study. It also controls for Pfeffer’s [1972] finding that 
certain industries have an optimum balance in the 
inside-outside director ratio. 
Lastly, the food industry is relatively free of 
regulation. Regulated industries sometimes attempt to 
co-opt the environment by placing former members of 
regulatory bodies on the board of directors [Pfeffer, 
1972]. Also, food firms are relatively free to introduce 
new products without extensive interference from 
regulatory agencies, as would be expected in industries 
such as pharmaceuticals or utilities. The industry is 
also relatively free from threats of intensive foreign 
competition . 
MEASURES. The boards of the 45 firms were classified 
into the two categories using the discriminant model 
generated in phase one of the research project. 1 he 
discriminant analysis of the 45 boards yielded 21 that 
were classified as managerial dominated and 24 classified 
as pluralistic. 
The financial performance measures used were Return 
on Shareholder Equity [ROE], Return on Assets [ROA] and 
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Total Return to Shareholders [TRS] as listed in the May 2, 
1983 Fortune 500 list for each firm’s 1982 fiscal year. 
The advantage of using the Fortune list for measures of 
financial performance was the standardization inherent in 
one source. All data is summarized in Appendix C, and a 
correlation matrix of independent variables is in 
Appendix E. 
TESTING HYPOTHESIS. The first hypothesis was tested 
using multiple analysis of variance to determine if there 
was a significant relationship between the board category 
and the Return on Shareholder Equity, Return on Assets and 
Total Return to Shareholders. This hypothesis was rejected 
at a 95% confidence level. Three multivariate tests of 
significance were used to analyze the hypothesis: Pillai’s 
criterion, Hotelling’s trace and Wilk's lambda; all 
yielded identical results; an approximate F of .60053 and 
a probability of .618. 
After analyzing the relationship between Return on 
Shareholder Equity, Return on Assets and Total Return to 
Shareholders another test of MAN0VA was run to determine 
if a significant relationship existed between ROE, R0A and 
board category. TRS was omitted because it was the least 
stable and most likely measure of financial performance to 
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cause uninterpretable results. These results were also 
not significant, and not particularly different from the 
analysis including all three measures of financial 
performance. The three multivariate tests of significance 
were again used to analyze the hypothesis: Pillai's 
criterion, Hotelling’s trace and Wilk’s 1ambda; all 
yielded identical results; an approximate F of .58020 and 
a probability of .564. 
Because multiple measures of financial performance 
failed to indicate a relationship between board category 
and financial performance, a further analysis was made of 
the financial measures independently of one another with 
analysis of variance. These results also failed to show 
any significant relationship between board category and 
ROE, ROA or TRS. They are shown in Table 6. 
These results show no significant difference by board 




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, ROE, ROA, TRS TAKEN INDEPENDENTLY 
WITH BOARD CATEGORY 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING [1], PHASE II 
FIN, 
MEASURE 
CATEGORY MEAN STD ERROR APPX F SIG 
ROE PLURALIST 15.12 1.03 
1 . 185 . 2824 
MANAGERIAL 13.14 1.54 
ROA PLURALIST 7.05 0.63 
0.800 .3760 
MANAGERIAL 6.20 0.70 
TRS PLURALIST 39.03 4.66 
0.005 .9442 
MANAGERIAL 39.80 10.37 
Testing for social pe r f ormance 
• 
To test the second hypothesis a sample was generated 
that included firms that are considered to have exemplary 
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social performance, and also firms that have inadequate 
social performance. After classification using the 
discriminant function model, a Chi Square test was used to 
test the hypothesis. 
SAMPLE. The sample for testing the second hypothesis 
was generated from two sources. The first source was the 
portfolio of the Dreyfus Third Century Mutual Fund. This 
fund restricts its portfolio to holdings of companies that 
are determined to be socially responsible. [Dreyfus 
1982:1 ] 
.the Fund considers a company’s record 
in the areas of (1)pro tection and improvement of 
the environment and the proper use of our 
natural resources, (2) occupational health and 
safety, (3) consumer protection and product 
purity and (4) equal employment opportunity. 
The firms contained in the Dreyfus Third Century Fund 
portfolio as of May 31, 1982 were defined as ’’socially 
responsible firms". Those firms that were listed in the 
Fortune 500 list of industrial firms as of May 2, 1983 and 
also in the Dreyfus portfolio comprised the socially 
responsible portion of the sample to test the hypothesis. 
The balance of the sample was generated from those 
firms identified by Lydenberg and Karpen [1982], writing 
for the Council on Economic Priorities. Lydenberg and 
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Karpen identify firms subject to shareholder resolutions 
during 1982 asking for improved social performance in the 
areas of management/employee relations, minority hiring, 
unionization, uranium processing and measures of consumer 
protection. To maintain consistency throughout model 
construction and hypothesis testing, only those firms also 
listed in the Fortune 500 industrial list were included. 
Using the Dreyfus Third Century Fund and the Council 
on Economic Priorities as the sources of the sample 
yielded 32 cases; sixteen from the Dreyfus list and 
sixteen from the Council on Economic Priorities list, all 
of which were also on the Fortune 500 Industrial list. 
MEASURES. The boards of the 32 firms were classified 
using the discriminant model generated in phase one of the 
research project. Those firms included in the Dreyfus 
Third Century Fund portfolio were defined as socially 
responsible, while those from the Council on Economic 
Priorities list were be defined as less socially 
responsible, in that the shareholders felt those firms 
were in need of remedial action. The discriminant 
classification procedure classified ten of the socially 
responsible firms as having pluralistic boards, and six as 
having managerial dominated boards. For the firms defined 
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as less socially responsible, fourteen had pluralistic 
boards and only two had managerial dominated boards. All 
data is summarized in Appendix D, and the correlation 
matrix for the independent variables is in Appendix F. 
TESTING HYPOTHESIS, The second hypothesis was tested 
using a Chi Square test of differences to determine if 
there was a significant relationship between board 
category and the defined measure of social 
responsibility. Using a 95% confidence interval the 
hypothesis was rejected. The actual crosstabulation of 
board category and social performance is shown in Table 7. 
In the instance of a 2 X 2 crosstabulation only one 
degree of freedom is present. In this case the Yates' 
Corrected Chi Square offers a closer approximation of the 
Chi Square Distribution, and is a preferable to the Raw 
Chi Square as an indication of significance [Dixon, 1983]. 
The hypothesis is therefore rejected. 
While the distribution lacks statistical 
significance, the direction of the relationship is 
notable. Boards that were dominated by management were 
associated with socially responsible firms in six of eight 
cases, or 75% of the time. Boards that were pluralistic 
were associated with socially responsible firms in only 
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ten of twenty four cases, or 42% of the time. Not only 
was the hypothesis of pluralistic boards being associated 
with socially responsible firms rejected, but the 
direction of the relationship seems to be reversed. 
However, it should be noted that the relationship 
continues to be not statistically significant. 
TABLE 7 
CHI SQUARE TEST OF DIFFERENCES, MANAGERIAL DOMINATED 
VERSUS PLURALISTIC BOARDS BY RESPONSIBLE AND LESS 
RESPONSIBLE FIRMS 
HYPOTHESIS [2] TESTING, PHASE II 
CROSSTABULATION °7 /Q N 
RESPONSIBLE/PLURALISTIC 31.3 10 
RESPONSIBLE/MANAGERIAL 18.8 6 
LESS-RESP/PLURALISTIC 43.8 14 
LESS-RESP/MANAGERIAL 6.3 2 
Corrected Chi Square = 1 .50 Sig = .2207 
Raw Chi Square = 2.66 Sig - .1025 
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Phase Three - Board Attributes and Corporate Performance 
The managerial dominated and pluralistic archetypes 
of boards of directors can not be related to corporate 
performance. However, previous empirical work has 
suggested significant relationships can be discovered 
between board attributes and financial performance, while 
many theorists have suggested boards of directors do have 
an impact on corporate social performance. In phase three 
of the research these suggestions were investigated. The 
procedure was to take the data compiled to test the 
hypotheses in phase two, and use regression forms of 
analysis to determine which attributes were significantly 
related to financial and social performance. Thus the 
population, sample and measures remained the same for both 
phase two and three. 
Attributes related to financial performance 
The initial analysis of board attributes and 
financial performance was done using canonical 
correlation. Canonical correlation is a statistical 
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procedure used when two sets of variables can logically be 
grouped, and each set compared with the other set 
[Warwick, 1975], In this research the three financial 
variables, ROE, ROA and TRS were grouped and compared with 
the ten board attributes investigated throughout the 
research. The objective was to find a particular 
canonical variate that related a particular set of board 
attributes to financial performance. This attempt proved 
futile, as no significant canonical variate was 
identified. 
Three canonical variates were generated. The first 
was significant at a .139 level, and explained 39.3% of 
the mutual variance. The other two canonical variates 
were significant only at a .349 and .647 level 
respectively, and explained 30.6% and 14.7% of the mutual 
variance. Adding to the difficulty was the general nature 
of the three variates, as they were generally not 
interpretable. In the first canonical variate ROE and ROA 
loaded inversely to one another, suggesting it would be 
possible to formulate a board that would induce opposite 
effects in these two measures of financial performance. 
This factor could not be identified as representing any 
common business strategy. The results of the canonical 
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correlation analysis [using raw data for input] are shown 
in Table 8. 
TABLE 8 
CANONICAL CORRELATIONS OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
BOARD ATTRIBUTES 
FINANCIAL MODELING, PHASE III 
FIRST SET 
ATTRIBUTE CANVAR 1 CANVAR 2 CANVAR 3 
CHCEO .44039 -.01141 .68117 
NMOUT -.32753 -.08092 .94518 
SROUT .21170 -.62579 -.12428 
BDOUT .25360 .02585 -.87684 
NMTGS -.06080 .50894 .33417 
SLRTO .72243 -.21102 .29581 
INNST .29903 . 10664 . 14083 
OUTST -.27726 -.61481 .26160 
MINOR .27231 -.08908 .16511 
TNURE -.36835 .04848 -.41924 
SECOND SET 
CANVAR 1 CANVAR 2 CANVAR 3 
ROE 1.48722 -.97598 -.87920 
ROA -1.30170 -.18786 1.12746 
TRS .16835 .84529 .90814 
The results of the canonical correlation analysis did 
not offer much help in understanding the relationship 
between board attributes and financial performance. The 
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lack of significant relationships between the two sets of 
variables, and the seemingly inconsistent loadings made 
the analysis uninformative. Similar results were obtained 
using only two measures of financial performance in other 
canonical correlation analyses. 
A follow up analysis was done using the three 
measures of financial performance independently of one 
another in a multiple linear regression analysis. This 
was done in a stepwise manner, using the three measures of 
financial performance as the dependent variable. The 
objective was to develop a set of models significant at 
the .05 level, while maximizing the explained variance in 
the dependent variable. Further, each of the stepwise 
multiple regressions were to be "well behaved", having a 
steady increase in the amount of variance explained by the 
model as variables were added, and the relative magnitude, 
signs and significance of each Beta were to remain 
relatively stable as variables were added. These 
requirements were met, indicating the basic assumptions of 
multiple regression were not grossly violated. 
The models generated are shown in Tables 9 and ]0. 
Each table shows the non-standardized coefficients of the 
equation and relevant significance levels. 
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TABLE 9 
STEPWISE REGRESSION, RETURN ON 
FINANCIAL MODELING, PHASE 
EQUITY 
III 





CONSTANT 7.370 .005 
1 SROUT .067 .042 .071 .076 
2 SLRTO 3.409 .014 .163 .023 
3 CHCEO 3.816 .083 . 198 .027 
4 OUTST .077 .315 .225 .033 
5 TNURE -.087 .330 .244 .045 
KEY 
CHCEO CHAIRMAN/CEO 
SROUT SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
SLRTO SALARY RATIO 
OUTST OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
TNURE TENURE CHAIRMAN/CEO 
82 
TABLE 10 
STEPWISE REGRESSION, RETURN ON ASSETS 
FINANCIAL MODELING, PHASE III 
OVERALL OVERALL 
STEP VARIABLE B SIG R SQRD SIG 
CONSTANT 5.910 .000 
i SROUT .032 .058 .083 .054 
2 OUTST .070 .077 .150 .033 
KEY 
SROUT SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
OUT ST OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
Variables that were included with individual levels 
of significance greater than .10 were included to increase 
the overall R Square, and to maximize the variance 
accounted for in the regression. 
Some attributes do have a significant relationship 
with measures of financial performance. The fact that the 
explanatory power of the models ranges from a low of 15% 
to a high of 24% also indicates the models are of value, 
particularly considering the number of undefined 
intervening variables. There was no model for Total 
Return to Shareholders that was significant at the .05 
probability level. These models are interpreted in the 
next chapter. 
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Attributes Related to Social Performance 
The analysis of board attributes associated with 
greater social responsibility was done with the logistic 
stepwise regression program in the BMDP Statistical 
Package. The straightforward multiple regression used in 
the analysis of financial performance was inappropriate 
for the social responsiblity analysis, due to the 
dichotomous nature of the social responsibility measure. 
The result of the analysis of attributes associated 
with social performance was quite simple. This is 
desireable because of the small number of cases in 
relation to the number of independent variables. 
Exploratory models with large numbers of independent 
variables were unstable. The model offering the greatest 
explanatory power is shown in Table 11. 
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TABLE 11 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
WITH BOARD ATTRIBUTES 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY MODELING, PHASE III 
VARIABLE BETA T SIG 
CONSTANT -11.200 2.47 <.05 
SLRTO 10.100 2.47 <.05 
OUTST .164 2.22 <.05 
MINOR -.583 2.70 <.05 
Tests of goodness of fit: 
BROWN 
H0SMER 
CHI SQ GOODNESS OF FIT = 1.242 
CHI SQ GOODNESS OF FIT = 3.667 
[DF=6 ] 
[DF=2] 
p = .537 






OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
% MINORITY MEMBERSHIP 
Using this logistic model with board attributes 
yields a score for each board, ranging from zero to one. 
The more positive the logistic regression score for the 
dependent variable, the more it moves toward identifying a 
socially responsible firm. The cut point is the point at 
which boards are divided into either managerial dominated 
The output gives the complete range of or pluralistic. 
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available cut points, so the user may select the desired 
level of reliability. Using a cut point of .792 with the 
above model yielded 87.5% of the cases correctly 
classified. This would indicate the model has moderately 
good fit [Dixon, 1983: 340], 
The Chi-Square goodness of fit statistics essentially 
answer the question, "What is the probability of the 
observed frequencies occuring by chance if the estimated 
structure is correct?". The better the fit, the smaller 
the Chi-Square value, and the less likely the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the specified structure is the 
correct one. Thus, the smaller the Chi-Square and the 
higher the reported probability, the better the fit 
[Hanushek and Jackson, 1977: 197]. 
The Brown goodness-of-fit test compares the fit of 
the data to the logistic or some alternate member of the 
family of models. A small p-value indicates that the 
logistic model is not appropriate for the data [Dixon, 
1983: 333]. 
The Hosmer goodness-of-fit test compares the observed 
and predicted frequencies of ten cells. Cells are defined 
by the predicted values. A small p-value means the 
predicted values do not fit the data [Dixon, 1983: 33^]. 
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The usefulness of such a simple model may be in the 
attributes that were not found to be significant. A model 
offering such high predictive power wj.th so few 
independent variables seems to run counter to much of the 
conventional thought about how boards of directors can be 
reformulated to move the firm toward greater social 
responsibility. An analysis of the model is included in 
the following chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This chapter analyzes and interprets the results of 
phases two and three of the research. It includes in this 
analysis considerations of reliability and validity, and 
draws some generalizations from the statistical analysis. 
Reliability and validity interpretations are based on 
Kerlinger [1973], Cook and Campbell [1975] and Kidder 
[ 1982] . 
Financial Performance 
Efforts to analyze financial performance through an 
aggregation of board attributes through discriminant 
analysis and canonical correlation were unsuccessful. 
Comparisons made with aggregate or individual measures of 
financial performance with aggregated board attributes 
proved to be statistically insignificant, and even then 
uninterpretable. The success of the model building 
process in phase one suggests the conceptual notion of 
pluralist and managerial dominated archetypes of boards of 
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directors is appropriate, but these board types do not 
have a clear relationship to financial performance. The 
use of multiple regression in phase three was an effort to 
determine if some other archetype of board might be more 
closely related to superior financial performance. 
The analysis of the multiple regression models in 
phase three was done by simply examining the signs of the 
significant independent variables. The results are shown 
in Table 12. 
The signs of these significant variable suggest ROE 
and ROA can be maximized when a board is composed and 
structured with the following attributes: 
1. An outside dominated social responsibility 
committee. 
2. Large amounts of stock held by outside directors. 
This board does not have many distinguishable 
characteristics, although those significant 
characteristics definitely suggest a more pluralistic 
boar d form. 
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TABLE 12 
SIGNS OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
ATTRIBUTE ROE ROA 
CHCEO + 
NMOUT 










NMOUT NOMINATING COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
SROUT SOCIAL RESP COMM, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
BDOUT COMPOSITION, % OUTSIDE MEMBERS 
NMTGS FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS 
SLRTO SALARY RATIO 
INNST INSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
OUTST OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
MINOR % MINORITY MEMBERSHIP 
TNURE TENURE CHAIRMAN/CEO 
ROE RETURN ON EQUITY 
ROA RETURN ON ASSETS 
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To maximize only ROE, presumably without any 
significant negative effect on ROA, the board should have 
the following characteristics in addition to those above: 
1. A chairman who is also the CEO. 
2. A high salary ratio, with the highest paid executive 
receiving much more than the second highest paid 
executive. 
3. A short tenure for the chairman/CEO. 
The firm has outsiders on the board who own large blocks 
of stock, but are not active in the management of the 
firm. The board, concerned about the long term success of 
the corporation, brings in a strong, charismatic 
Chairman/CEO as a "take charge" corporate leader. This 
new leader is well paid and given nearly a free reign to 
make fundamental corporate changes, but the board retains 
its power to make normative decisions about the nature and 
direction of the firm. This description is most similar 
to that of a board using normative control under Molz ' 
[forthcoming] typology, a consultive board by Vance's 
[1983] typology or Bazerman and Schoorman's [1983] 
reciprocity board. An example might be Chrysler 
Corporation or International Harvester. 
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Reliability of Financial Performance Models 
The reliability of the financial performance models 
should be quite high. Of the three financial measures, 
Total Return to Shareholders has the highest reliability 
in that it is based on facts that are not subject to 
interpretation. Information of stock dividends and stock 
appreciation is clear and unambiguous. Its reliability is 
high . 
Measures of Return on Shareholder Equity and Return 
on Assets are also highly reliable. These measures were 
taken from audited corporate financial records as they 
were submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
While there is some room for corporations to use creative 
financial analysis in generating these statistics, the 
fact they were all audited by a Certified Professional 
Accounting firm, and reported to a government regulatory 
agency, enhances the reliability. All of the measures on 
financial performance were taken from the Fortune 500 Lis t 
of Industrial firms. Obtaining all of the data from one 
source further enhances its reliability. 
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Measures of the various board attributes were 
obtained from corporate proxy statements, annual reports, 
Security and Exchange Commission 10K reports and Moody’s 
Industrial Manual. With the exception of Moody’s 
Industrial Manual, all of these represent primary 
corporate documents. Two of the documents, the corporate 
proxy statements and SEC 10K reports are required by 
regulation, and as such most of the information on the ten 
attributes is included by regulation. The fact the 
Securities and Exchange Commission requires disclosure of 
this information in a particular format enhances its 
reliability. Disclosure on the two attributes which were 
not required by regulation were those on minority 
representation and tenure. Information on tenure was 
frequently included in the proxy statements, and always 
included in the Moody’s Industrial Manual. Information on 
minority representation was inferred from biographical 
information on directors, which was most often available 
in the proxy statements and annual reports. Due to the 
non-ambiguous nature of these measurable attributes, there 
were no problems of interpretive reliability. Coding was 
primarily mechanical rather t:han interpretive, adding to 
its high level of reliability. 
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Validity of Financial Performance Models 
Construct Validity. For the models that were 
statistically significant, the construct validity is 
high. The models are theory driven, and the extent to 
which the theories of the individual attributes are valid, 
the models are also valid. The collection of the data 
from primary corporate sources also improves its construct 
validity. 
Face Validit y. Face validity is high in that the 
models that were suggested to be most associated with high 
levels of financial performance were similar to conceptual 
models described by Bazerman and Schoorman [1983], Vance 
[1983] and Molz [forthcoming]. These conceptual models 
were developed based on actual experience, organizational 
theory and stakeholder theory. The models as described 
are sensible and consistent. 
Statistical and Internal Validity. The statistical 
validity of the multiple regression models, which v/ere the 
only ones with statistical significance, is quite good. 
Examination of the models for gross violations of 
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statistical assumptions yielded no evidence that the 
models were misleading in their results. The models 
explained between 15% and 24% of the variance in the 
different measures of financial performance, depending on 
the measure. While it is obvious that other factors 
influence between 76% and 85% the total variance, such 
levels of explanatory power are not inconsequential. 
External Validity. The external validity of these 
models is limited. The population from which the sample 
was drawn was the Fortune 500 Industrial list. Further, 
the selection was not random, but rather was industry 
specific. Attempts to use these models to describe boards 
at 1arge must be made with care; there is no justification 
to use the models on firms that are outside the Fortune 
500 Industrial list, and the single industry nature of the 
study must be noted when using the models within the 
Fortune 500 Industrial list. This is particularly true 
when recalling Pfeffer's findings that boards were 
frequently composed to take advantage of industry specific 
capital constraints. 
Taken in aggregate, the suggested models are 
reasonably reliable and valid. Specific limitations 
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should be kept in mind when using the models beyond their 
original data base, but the conclusions generated are 
empirically sound. 
Social Performance 
The analysis of the Chi Square model of differences 
indicates no significant relationship between managerial 
dominated or pluralistic board types and social 
performance. But, as noted earlier, the direction of the 
relationship is reversed from the hypothesized 
relationship. Thus, it would seem managerial dominated 
boards lean toward more social responsibility than 
pluralistic boards. This relationship could be explained 
in several possible ways; a greater clarity of internal 
board values, greater knowledge of what the firm is 
actually doing, or less need to demonstrate that pluralism 
does not equate to radicalism. 
A pluralist board by definition has diverse interests 
represented, and no one group will have the dominant power 
within the board. This may lead to conflicting values and 
a difficulty in agreeing what course of action is the most 
desireable. The lack of one central influence group that 
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can demand a particular line of actions be developed that 
is consistent with their interests may mean there is no 
consistent line of action; the action the firm takes is 
not goal directed or driven by one particular sense of 
values. Hambrick and Mason [1984] have described the 
effectiveness of strategies achieving organizational 
outcomes as reflections of the values and cognitive bases 
of powerful actors in the organization. Researchers and 
theorists have suggested an effective board is 
characterized by consensus building behavior rather than 
debating behavior [Welty, 1983], and shared values 
[Parker, 1983]. Given the general qualifications of most 
board members, it is difficult to believe that such 
individuals might have values that were hostile to the 
general social wellbeing. However, in a pluralistic board 
no single clear set of values can be defined or accepted, 
the board focuses on debate rather than consensus. The 
corporation drifts into socially unresponsible actions, 
not because the members individually lack a sense of 
socially responsible behavior, but the board cannot agree 
on what is or is not considered socially responsible. 
Another explanation is that the managerial dominated 
board is composed of individuals who are experts on the 
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operation of the corporation. This managerial dominated 
board, being composed of well qualified people who share a 
common value system, while also having a very clear 
understanding of the operations of the firm, can make 
better decisions about trade offs between socially 
responsible actions and the best course for the firm. By 
not having to concern themselves directly with satisfying 
the various constituencies of a pluralistic board, they 
can concentrate on maximizing corporate effectiveness, 
both in terms of operational goals and social goals. The 
social goals become a part of the operational 
considerations by which the managers are evaluated, and 
such considerations become a part of the overall 
indigenous corporate culture, rather than an esoteric 
objective imposed upon the operating managers by some 
isolated and uninformed group sitting in the corporate 
boardroom. Sonnenfeld [1981] found that executives that 
spent less time interacting with stakeholders were more 
tolerant and empathetic with the stakeholders' concerns. 
Thus a board that is managerial dominated can be more 
responsive to stakeholder issues than a pluralistic 
board. 
Another possible explanation is that the pluralistic 
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board, being a relatively new phenomenon, is more 
concerned with fitting into the perceived boardroom 
culture than they are in assertively representing their 
constituents [Spencer, 1983], The pluralistic board may in 
fact be less effective in representing the genuine 
pluralism of the corporate stakeholders than the more 
managerial dominated board. A study of Irish workers 
sitting on boards of directors has found the workers to be 
ineffective in representing the views of labor at the 
board level [Costello, 1983]. Spencer [1983a] found a new 
board member was most accepted when he was perceived as 
being from the same class as the existing board members, 
was cooperative and sought to understand the positions of 
the current board in terms of policies, strategies and 
values. Lacking this, the board may degenerate into a 
debating society, unable to reach a consensus necessary to 
lead the corporation. The managerial board, with a 
clearer sense of common values and organizational 
knowledge, can effectively understand the objectives of 
stakeholders and consider these objectives when making 
corporate decisions about socially responsibility. The 
pluralist board, with actual representatives of these 
stakeholders, sends mixed signals to the aggregate board 
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decision process. The representatives of these corporate 
stakeholders, trying to demonstrate their commitment to 
the well being of the corporation, don't effectively 
present their constituent’s views, but rather rationalize 
away such an effective presentation in order to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of having such constituents 
represented. To effectively present the views of these 
constituencies might antagonize the decision makers on the 
board, freezing the constituency representatives out of 
the real decision process. It thus becomes more rational 
to suppress the presentation of constituency issues for 
the sake of remaining in the decision process. 
Using the logistic regression to get a better picture 
of the attributes that are most closely associated with 
socially responsible firms supports these 
interpretations. A restatement of the results of the 
logistic regression, and a consideration of the range of 
the relevant variables for the socially responsible 
port:.on of the study are shown in Table 13. 
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TABLE 13 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBLITY AND 
RANGE OF ATTRIBUTES 





OUTST . 164 00- 56 
MINOR -.583 00- 17 
KEY 
SLRTO SALARY RATIO 
* 
OUTST OUTSIDE DIRECTORS STOCK 
MINOR % MINORITY MEMBERSHIP 
An examination of the logistic regression indicates 
that as, [1] the salary ratio increases, [2] greater 
amount of stock is held by outside directors, and [3] 
fewer minority representatives are present, the greater 
the social responsibility. Further, the combination of 
the value of the salary ratio coefficient and its range 
balance the negative value of the constant, automatically 
bringing the dependent variable near zero. Thus, as the 
salary range moves beyond its lower limit, social 
responsibility increases as the salary ratio increases and 
more stock is held by outside directors . Minority 
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representation, however, reduces this trend toward greater 
social responsibility. Many of the firms defined to be 
socially responsible had low percentages of stock held by 
outside directors, so the relative combination of all 
three attributes is critical. 
This is consistent with the discussion of the 
findings of the managerial dominated and pluralistic 
archetypes. It would be wrong to interpret the logistic 
regression as supporting the managerial dominated 
archetype, as several of the characteristics of the 
managerial board were not statistically significant. 
These include the following attributes that were excluded 
as not significant: [1] the chairman may or may not be the 
CEO, [2] the presence or lack of outside directors on 
nominating or social responsibility committees, [3] the 
number of meetings held by the board, [4] the amount of 
stock held by the inside directors or [5] the tenure of 
the CEO/Chairman. The socially responsible corporation 
seems to have a board in which a dominant set of values 
are allowed to flourish. This dominant set of values may 
come from a single charismatic individual in the 
organization, as supported by the significance of the 
salary ratio, or from outside directors who hold large 
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amounts of stock and are determined that the corporation 
operate in a manner consistent with their value system. 
In any case the existence of minorities on the board only 
seems to confuse the sense the board has as to proper 
social actions. 
This in no way suggests that minorities have less 
social concern than any other group to whom the 
corporation is responsible. Rather there are three [or 
more] possible explanations for this finding. First, it 
suggests the different values of minorities may muddle an 
otherwise consistent set of corporate values, causing 
confusion in defining relevant social goals. This is 
consistent with Sonnenfeld' s [1981] view. Second,it may 
be that managers have a better sense of balancing socially 
responsible actions with other corporate objectives. 
Third,it may be that the newness of minority 
representation has not allowed sufficient time for the 
minorities to become secure in their access to the 
decision making process, causing a suppression of 
effectively presenting their constituents views. 
The board which maximizes social performance is not 
the same as the board that maximizes financial 
performance. The board that maximizes financial 
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performance seemed to fit the board archetype exercising 
normative control, consultive behavior or reciprocal 
interaction. The board maximizing social performance 
seems to emphasize singleness of a value system, which may 
be achieved through either a coalition of outside 
directors who are major stockholders and a single powerful 
professional manager, or one of these alone. In either 
case the board is not structured to promote pluralist, 
active or collegial behavior, or social control. Such a 
board could be managerial dominated, such as Vance’s 
[1983] managerial dominated syndical board, or shareholder 
dominated, or a coalition of the two. This aggregated 
alternative would not be expected to have some attributes 
appear as statistically significant when the two are 
lumped together. Specifically, the two are conceptually 
expected to differ in the areas of joint Chairman/CEO, 
committee structure, frequency of board meetings, 
domination by inside directors or the tenure of the 
CEO/Chairman. Because of these differences they do not 
show up as statistically significant variables in the 
logistic regression when the two board types are lumped 
together . 
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Reliability of the Social Responsiblity Models 
The models developed for social responsibility used 
all of the same board attributes and data gathering 
techniques as the financial models, so all of the comments 
regarding reliability in the financial performance models 
apply to the social responsibility models. 
The indications of social responsibility were 
gathered separately from the information for the financial 
performance models. Other researchers have used two 
different methods to define social responsibility, neither 
of which was entirely satisfactory for this research. 
The first technique is based upon the reputation of 
the firm. Several indexes of social responsibility have 
been developed using either the assesment of a single 
individual or surveys of experts in the area [Council of 
Economic Priorities, 1971; Moscowitz, 1972, 1975]. These 
indexes were not used for several, reasons. First, they 
were not chronologically comparable with other needed data 
for this research. Much of the data on corporate boards 
of directors has only recently become available, following 
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disclosure regulations promulgated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The relevant information on board 
attributes was most available for the 1982 fiscal year, 
and it would have been an illogical effort to relate board 
composition and structure to measures of a firms’ social 
performance from the early 1970’s. Second, these indexes 
were highly subjective, and third, they were in no way 
representative of any definable larger population [Cochran 
and Wood, 1984]. 
The second method of measuring corporate social 
responsibility was based on content analysis of corporate 
annual reports and other relevant documents. This method 
was developed by Beresford [1973, 1975, 1976] and Bowman 
[1976], This method has several disadvantages which made 
it inappropriate for this research. First, it is highly 
subjective in defining what variables to include in the 
analysis [Cochran and Wood, 1984], Second, it is only an 
indication of what firms say they are doing, which may be 
very different from what they are doing in fact [Cochran 
and Wood, 1984], Third, the very fact this method has been 
developed leads to its bias. Corporations today are 
concerned with being labled "socially unresponsible”, and 
will take efforts to present a more positive image. 
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Certainly any firm concerned about such an image could 
easily bias the development of a social responsiblity 
scale by simply including in annual reports and other 
documents many positive references to social 
accomplishment. Lastly, corporate annual reports vary 
widely in development and purpose. The information 
legally mandated in an annual report is minimal; large 
firms use their annual report primarily to communicate 
positive images of the corporation to the shareholder. 
Smaller firms, or firms with large amounts of stock held 
by inside managers, need be less concerned with pleasing 
outside minority shareholders, and at the same time may 
feel production of a large and sophisticated annual report 
is a poor use of shareholders’ assets. These firms might 
put out the minimally required annual report, and include 
nothing on corporate social responsibility. 
Having rejected both of these measures of corporate 
social responsibility, new measures were required. The 
criteria for selecting an appropriate measure was focused 
around adopting a measure developed by a experts in the 
analysis of firms' social behavior. Such experts would 
have time, motivation and an unbiased set of criteria to 
examine a wide range of information that would allow an 
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assesment of corporate social responsibility. The 
measures used in this research met those criteria. 
The Dreyfus Third Century Fund portfolio is generated 
by a professional investment firm that has a professional 
staff examining the social behavior of firms. Only those 
firms are selected for the portfolio that specifically 
meet criteria described in the methodology section. 
The list generated by the Council on Economic 
Priorities of less responsible corporations is based on 
shareholder proposals to rectify inadequate social 
performance. These proposals were submitted by well 
organized activist groups that scan large numbers of 
corporations. Corporations targeted by these groups 
consistently carry out unacceptable social behavior. 
Organizations that monitor such behavior include the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the New 
World Foundation and the Project on Corporate 
Responsibility [Lydenberg and Karpen, 3 98 2 ] . These 
organizations have professional staff members that do much 
the same sort of analysis as the Dreyfus Third Century 
Fund staff. 
The main disadvantage of this measure of social 
responsibility is its dichotomous nature, not allowing a 
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deeper analysis into continuous gradations of social 
responsibility. It is, however, generated independently 
of this research, presumably unbiased, current and based 
on analysis of large amounts of information. The 
reliability of this scale of social responsibility is 
equal to that of the two other scales used in prior 
research, and because it is current the scale has greater 
reliability for this research. 
Validity of Social Responsibility Models 
Internal and Statistical Validity. The internal and 
statistical validity of the Chi Square test of the second 
hypothesis is quite high. The model was simple and 
straightforward, the statistical analysis did not have to 
contend with problematic assumptions or variables. 
The logistic regression at the level presented is 
highly valid for both statistical and internal 
considerations. The mode] has moderate predictive power 
as indicated by the Hosmer and Brown goodness-of-fit 
tests, and is straightforward. The variables included did 
not seriously violate any assumptions necessary for a well 
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behaved model. As more variables were added problems of 
tractability developed due to variables sorting in 
divergent directions. Higher order models lacked either 
significance or explanatory power. The model presented 
offers the best balance of validity and explanatory 
power. 
Construct Validity. The construct validity of both 
models is quite high. The construct validity of the 
tested hypothesis is high; the model was fully theory 
driven, testing the works of Stone [1975] and March, 
Maakestad, and Heiland [undated]. The construct validity 
of the logistic model itself is good, in that all of the 
variables are direct measures of board form and 
composition, as in the financial models. 
The construct validity of the interpretation of the 
logistic model is somewhat weaker. While the concept of 
values affecting board interaction was developed by 
Spencer [1983, 1983a] and Parker [1983], the notion of 
consistent values within a board leading to greater social 
responsibility is somewhat speculative. Further, such 
boards being either managerial controlled or shareholder 
controlled is a rational conjecture, but not one that is 
overpowering in eliminating other possible explanations. 
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Face Validity. The face validity of the logistic 
model is good; the explanation offered is viable and 
consistent with the work of Spencer [1983, 1983a], Parker 
[ 1983 ] and Welty [ 1983] . 
External Validity. The external validity of both the 
rejected hypothesis and the logistic model is valid within 
the Fortune 500 Industrial list. Because the research was 
not industry specific it may extend across industry 
lines. The external validity does not extend beyond the 
Fortune 500 Industrial list. The external validity, 
statistical validity and internal validity of the logistic 
model should all be satisfactory. The interpretation of 
the logistic model, and its resulting face validity and 
construct validity in the sense of identifying a board 
archetype is weaker. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The development of the discriminant model in the 
first part of this research project has validated the 
concept of categorizing different boards of directors as 
either managerial dominated or pluralistic. However, the 
hypotheses that managerial dominated boards were 
associated with superior financial performance and 
pluralistic boards were associated with superior social 
performance were not supported. This research did 
demonstrate that the board of directors related to 
superior social performance is different from the board 
related to superior financial performance. The board 
associated with superior corporate financial performance 
seemed to fit the board archetype exercising normative 
control, consultive behavior and reciprocal interaction. 
The board related to superior corporate social performance 
seemed to emphasize singleness of a value system, which 
may be achieved through either a coalition of outside 
directors who are major shareholders and a singe powerful 
professional manager, or one of these alone. In either 
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case it seemed to be the singleness of a value system that 
was more important than a board structured to promote 
pluralist, active or collegial behavior, or social control 
of the board. 
A Contingency Theory of Board Composition and Structure 
An implicit objective in this research has been to 
apply empirical research techniques to get a better 
understanding of what might be an "ideal" board of 
directors. Many works have offered conceptual, 
theoretical and empirical evidence of what an ideal board 
might have for its composition and structure. This 
research has done three things: first, it created a model 
of two conceptual boards, managerial dominated and 
pluralistic; second, it used this model to test hypotheses 
relating these board archetypes to corporate performance; 
and third, it used regression analysis to identify 
particular attributes associated with superior 
performance. The implicit question of defining an ideal 
board form must now be addressed. 
Alas, addressing the question is easier than 
answering it in a deterministic sense. Perhaps the best 
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answer is that an ideal board form is contingent upon the 
overall objective of the board itself. Yet this is 
somewhat circular, in that theoretically boards of 
directors have as their main objective shaping a 
corporation that satisfies the shareholders’ interests. 
But the shareholders themselves have different objectives; 
some may wish to maximize current dividends, others long 
term growth, others socially responsible corporate 
actions, ad infinitum. If shareholders could actually 
practice corporate democracy the answer might be simpler, 
but the evidence seems to indicate most shareholders think 
of their corporation as primarily a financial investment, 
and not as a collection of human and capital assets, 
market position and the holder of unique competencies. 
The board must indeed carry out its fiduciary 
responsibilities for the many diverse shareholders. 
The board must also carry out an obligation to the 
society that has legitimized and nurtured the corporate 
form. There seems to be nothing in this nation's founding 
documents that clearly give precedence for the corporate 
form of mobilizing economic resources. This obvious but 
often unacknowledged fact demands that some form of 
corporate responsibility be an explicit part of the 
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fiduciary responsibility of the corporation. 
The ideal board form is in the eyes of the beholder, 
or at least the person who is addressing the question. 
For the individual adhering to a Milton Friedman approach 
to corporate purpose, the ideal board seems to be one that 
is active in the governing process; setting broad 
normative corporate goals and acts in a consultive 
manner. There is a separation between the governance 
function and the managerial function, although one 
individual may hold positions as both Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer. But this person is not 
a tyrant who can ignore or dismiss the wishes of the 
board, but rather a professional who serves at the 
pleasure of the board. Perhaps the clearest analogy would 
be that of the Prime Minister of Britain. The Prime 
Minister [or the Chairman/CEO] has tremendous power as 
long as he or she retains the confidence of the Parliament 
[or the Board of Directors], but once that confidence is 
shattered, the power of the individual rapidly 
dissipates. This research seems to verify the conceptual 
work of Miles Mace [1971] in describing an effective 
board . 
Someone who takes a broader view of the firm than 
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Friedman would describe a different ideal board. 
Christopher Stone’s argument that the board is an 
appropriate focal point to foster greater corporate social 
responsibility is certainly accurate. However, his 
argument for a more pluralistic board to achieve this goal 
seems to be incorrect. An ideal board to achieve greater 
corporate social responsible.ty seems to be a board that 
has a focus of values, and seeks out consensus on a 
strategy to operationalize these values. This ideal board 
is dependent upon the individuals who sit on the corporate 
board having values favoring positive social actions. 
This is consistent with the general background and 
qualifications of those who sit on boards of directors. 
Within our political mainstream there are many different 
factions, each espousing different and often conflicting 
definitions of social responsibility. Yet there are very 
few, if any, factions that espouse a clearly hostile view 
toward society. Responsible individuals may differ in 
their perceptions of abortion, school prayer, the Equal 
Rights Amendment, or aid to Central American nations. Yet 
no one argues for either side of one of these positions 
because they want society to be worse off; both sides 
promote their position to make society better off. So it 
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seems to be with corporate boards of directors. Being 
made up of responsible and well qualified individuals, 
society seems to be best served when a corporate board is 
composed of individuals who are likely to share the same 
value system, even though these values may not be shared 
by other responsible members of society. 
An ideal board related to both superior financial 
performance and superior social performance might be 
described as one that develops normative goals for the 
corporation, has a consultive interaction with the 
professional management, shares a common value system, and 
is ready and willing to replace a Chairman/CEO when the 
board loses confidence in the individual. However, 
different board forms would be more appropriate to 
maximize either financial returns or social 
responsibility. 
Implications for Future Research 
Several important issues have become evident in the 
course of this research that merit further investigation. 
One is to further research the notions that normative 
and consultive boards are associated with corporations 
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having superior financial performance, while the 
cohesiveness of internal board values is related to 
superior social performance. This would be a continuation 
of the research stream from which this dissertation grew. 
The empirical work done by Vance, Lanser, Pfeffer, 
Schmidt, Crail, Herman and Lynch all suggested the 
relevance of the financial performance hypothesis tested 
in this research. The conceptual, work cone by Friedman, 
Dooley, Stone, Brudney and others suggested the relevance 
of the social performance hypothesis tested in this 
research. Additional work needs to be done, building upon 
the findings of this research. 
Another important area of research is causality. 
None of the empirical research has demonstrated causality 
in the relationship between board form and financial 
performance or social performance. The assumption of 
causality has been implicit in much of the empirical 
research and explicit in nearly all of the conceptual 
research, but tested in neither case. Such investigations 
of causality could be carried out through longitudinal 
studies of corporations or through new statistical causal 
modeling techniques. 
This research could have its external validity 
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extended by using the same techniques to study different 
industries and different populations. The food industry 
was chosen for reasons detailed in the methodology 
section, and this methodology can readily be used to 
investigate industry differences in board form and 
financial performance. Similarily, it would be 
significant research to test other populations, such as 
non-industrial firms or smaller firms. 
From a methodological perspective, research is sorely 
needed in better measures of social performance. The 
techniques used in this research and in other research are 
all inadequate in some sense, particularly when compared 
with available measures of financial, performance or 
corporate growth. 
Lastly, research is needed in a more fundamental area 
of corporate legitimization. The corporate form has been 
legitimized historically and legally. Research is needed 
in the role of the board of directors in this ongoing 
process. 
The board of directors is an often overlooked unit in 
considering corporate strategy. Although researchers are 
becoming more cognizant of this void, much additional work 
needs to be done in the areas of enterprise goal 
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formulation, the role of the board in evaluating ongoing 
corporate strategies and the role of information flows to 
the board in the strategic management process. 
Operational Implications 
How is this research relevant to activists seeking to 
change corporate social behavior, board nominating 
committees seeking to improve board and corporate 
performance or other concerned individuals? Several 
operational suggestions are appropriate. 
First, changes in board composition and structure 
should not be made without careful consideration for 
potential outcomes. The increasingly popular notion that 
outside dominated and pluralistic boards will lead to 
improved corporate performance should be questioned, as 
this study and most others do not support this notion. 
Such a change may improve the corporation's legitimization 
with society, but this has also yet to be proven. Given 
the evidence such shifts in board form may have a negative 
impact on corporate performance, it is unwise to move 
toward greater pluralism or outside control to achieve 
greater legitimization when that relationship has not been 
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demonstrated. 
Second, if changes are made, it is probably best to 
move toward a board that understands the difference 
between its governance function, and the managerial 
function of the professional managers. The board should 
be constructed to facilitate development of normative 
goals, consensus decisions and a willingness to dismiss a 
Chairman/CEO when appropriate. Potential directors should 
be selected for their individual competencies and 
acceptance of a common value system. Selection of a 
director as a representative of some particular group in 
society is probably unwise; it would be better to nominate 
directors without consideration for their minority status, 
as selection on this criteria alone may be related to a 
muddling of the board’s value system. 
Third, some theorists have expressed concern over the 
lack of separation of the Chairman of the Board and the 
Chief Executive Officer positions. This research fails to 
demonstrate any negative impact of this practice, and in 
fact seems to demonstrate it is generally useful. It is 
more important that the board recognize its role in the 
governance process and assert its willingness to change a 
Chairman/CEO whenever it loses confidence in a particular 
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individual. 
All in all, this study suggests board composition and 
structure can be related to corporate social and financial 
performance. However, theorists and practitioners 
advocating greater outside control and pluralism of the 
board of directors are misconstruing and overly 
simplifying the nature of this relationship. 
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